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ABSTRACT 
There is a body of academic literature addressing two issues of importance for leveling the 
playing field for all classes of investors: 1) the impact of institutional investors on liquidity; and 
2) the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on institutional investors and liquidity. Our study 
addresses both issues with the purpose of attaining a better understanding and explanation of this 
relationship. We classify institutional ownership according to Bushee's (1998, 2001) 
methodology; transient institutions, dedicated institutions and quasi-indexers. Our results indicate 
that while transient institutions and quasi-indexers have a positive impact on liquidity, dedicated 
institutional ownership is negatively associated with liquidity. This result is consistent with prior 
theoretical studies. We also find that the effectiveness ofthe Regulation Fair Disclosure in 
improving liquidity is limited to firms with higher transient institutional ownership, whereas 
quasi-indexed institutions have not been significantly affected by the regulations. In fact, the 
liquidity of firms is lower for firms with higher dedicated institutional holdings, which is 
evidence of the "chilling effect". 
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I. Introduction 
The U.S. equity market has undergone a shift in ownership structure over the past 50 years, from 
primarily individual direct holdings decades ago to institutional holding today. Institutional 
ownership of common stock has experienced a substantial increase, becoming a major component 
of equity markets. The Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds reports that institutions owned 
approximately 7 percent of US equities in 1950. In Graph I, we show the percentage of 
institutional owned stock shares from 1990 to 2009. The past two decades has seen a great 
relative increase in the ownership of publicly held shares by institutions. In 2007, institution 
ownership peaked, with 65.58% of stock shares. Consequently, the influence of institutional 
investors on the stock market and the country's economy has increased significantly. Friedman 
(1996) points out that institutionalization symbolizes concentration of investment decision 
making and discusses the potential consequences of this trend on the U.S. equity market on the 
financing for growth companies, on market volatility, on the market price for risk, and on 
corporate governance. He also contends that institutionalization impacts on the financing of 
emerging companies and raises volatility, mutual funds create an illusion ofliquidity, defmed 
contribution pension plans (e.g. 401-K plans) increase the market price of risk, and institutions 
have become more vocal in the governance of corporate business. Institutions impact the 
American capital markets in numerous ways. The first objective of this study is to examine the 
impact of institutional ownership on stock liquidity. 
Why is liquidity so important? This topic has received substantial attention among academics 
and practitioners alike. The discussion on liquidity relates to important areas in fmance such as 
corporate finance, asset pricing and market microstructure. And the impact of liquidity on 
fmancial market has a result on various aspects Demsetz (1968) applies the notion of economic 
efficiency and proposes that increase in liquidity can lead to improved sharing of financial risks 
and result in lower transaction costs, which explains the domination ofNYSE in trading 
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) contend that illiquidity can be derived from transaction 
costs, inventory risk, information asymmetry, market frictions and can explain problems such as 
the equity premium puzzle, the risk-free rate puzzle and the small fmn effect. Liquidity also plays 
an indispensable role in the price discovery process. Recent studies indicate that both the level of 
liquidity and liquidity risk are priced in the share values. As well recent empirical studies fmd that 
the effects of liquidity on asset prices are both statistically and economically significant (Easley 
and O'Hara 2004; O'Hara 2003). 
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While there is a general consensus on the importance of liquidity, and studies have shown that 
various aspects of institutional investors' influence on ftrms' decisions, both directly (Agrawal 
and Mendelker 1990; Bushee 1998; Hartzell and Starkes 2003; Almazan, Hartzell and Starks 
2005; Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman and Parrino 2006) and indirectly (Parrino, Sias and 
Starks 2003), less is known about whether institutions playa positive or negative role in the 
aggregate market and on the ftrm level. Likewise, much has been written in the literature 
examining the effect of informed traders on liquidity (Kyle, 1985; Subrahmanyam, 1991; Shari, 
Shastri and Shastri, 2000; Rubin, 2007; Agarwal, 2007). However, underlying differences in 
modeling the trading behavior of informed investors, the trading motives of uninformed investors 
and information structure result in different predictions for stock liquidity in the presence of 
multiple informed traders. For instance, under the risk-neutral assumption, Kyle's (1985) model 
predicts that an increase in the number of informed traders results in a more liquid market 
because of competition; Subrahmanyam (1991) takes risk-aversion of informed traders into 
consideration and demonstrates a non-monotonic relation between informed traders and liquidity. 
Empirical work on institutional ownership and liquidity also shows mixed results. Shari, Shastri 
and Shastri (2000) conduct cross-sectional analysis and ftnd that higher insider and institutional 
ownership is associated with both wider spreads and smaller quoted depth. They also show 
evidence that information asymmetry faced by traders is caused by insider ownership instead of 
institutional holdings. Rubin (2007) fmds that liquidity increases with the level of institutional 
holdings due to higher trading activity and decreases with institutions' block holdings due to 
higher adverse selection. Agarwal (2007) fmds a U-shaped relationship between institution-
owned shares and stock liquidity, which implies that both the adverse selection effect and the 
information efficiency effect of institutions exist. In addition, he points out that the relationship 
is subject to changes of investment horizons and risk aversion. In summary, the existing literature 
on the relationship between institutional ownership and stock liquidity seem to indicate mixed 
empirical results supporting different theoretical predictions. 
The ftrst objective of this study is to further test the relationship between institutional ownership 
and stock liquidity by separately examining the effects of different types of institutions. 
Institutions are not a homogeneous group and they differ in their trading motives and behaviors. 
Poster (1993) points out the unique U.S. institution pattern and classiftes the capital provided by 
institutions into fluid capital and dedicated capital. Bushee (1998) sorts institutions into three 
categories: transient institutions, dedicated institutions, and quasi-indexed institutions, based on 
different trading behaviors and strategies employed. In this study, we adopt Bushee's 
classification scheme and examine to what extent different types of institutions may exert 
different impacts on stock liquidity. By doing so, we attempt to reconcile the mixed findings in 
the empirical literature on the relationship between institutional ownership on stock liquidity. 
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The second objective of this study is to further test the role of different types of institutions on 
liquidity, in the face of an exogenous shock to their information disclosure regulation, namely, the 
u.s. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Fair Disclosure (FD). Implemented on 
October 23, 2000, Regulation FD mandated that all publicly traded companies to disclose 
material information to all investors at the same time. This regulation prohibits selective 
disclosure of material information to analyst and large institutional investors and aims to 'level 
the playing field' among investors and increases the confidence and fairness in public capital 
markets. The SEC was concerned that selective disclosure benefits a privileged few investors to 
profit at the expense of the investing public and this unfairness causes the loss of confidence in 
the integrity ofthe capital markets. FD intends to curtail selective disclosure and "encourage 
continued widespread investor participation in our markets, enhancing market efficiency and 
liquidity, and more effective capital raising" (SEC, 2000). There are two noteworthy points in the 
SEC mandate. First, the SEC believes that by 'leveling the playing field', liquidity can be 
improved. Verrecchia (2001) provides a theoretical argument to support this assertion. He 
contends that commitment to greater corporate disclosure can ameliorate the adverse selection 
component of the cost of capital and increase market liquidity, as more information in the public 
domain makes it more difficult and more costly for traders to become privately informed. Second, 
large institutional investors are one of the main target groups of Reg FD. It thus follows that the 
SEC carries out Reg FD to increase the liquidity of stock market through changing the 
information advantage of institutional investors. This motivates the second objective of our study, 
which is to test the impacts of Reg FD on liquidity through different institutional investors. 
The implementation of Reg FD raises debates on the effect ofthis regulation. Proponents argue 
that a broader group of investors have greater access to market-moving information as 
information that was previously disclosed through the selective disclosure channel (e.g., analyst 
conference calls) is now open to the public after Reg FD (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2004), 
making the market more fair. On the other hand, opponents of Reg FD (especially large brokerage 
firms) contended that Reg FD would result in 'a chilling effect', fearing that the public would 
mishandle the information, thus resulting in decreased information flow to the market. Our study 
sheds light on this debate and examines whether or not Reg FD improves stock liquidity through 
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decreased informed trading (lower information asymmetry). There has been no agreement on this 
debate as yet. 
Early studies provide evidence of a decrease in bid-ask spreads after Reg FD. (Bushee, 
Matsumoto, and Miller, 2004; Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Eleswarapu, Thompson, and 
Venkataraman, 2004). Chiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong and Wood (2004) fmd that Reg 
FD improves liquidity and decreases the level of information asymmetry (adverse selection costs) 
in NYSE stocks. They confirm that before the implementation ofFD, institutional trading 
activity, (measured by trade frequency, share volume and dollar volume,) increases in pre-
announcement, which suggests institutions do trade on private information. These three measures 
of institutional trading activity drop in the post-FD period, even after adjusting for benchmarks. 
Furthermore, they show that decline in information asymmetry around earnings announcements is 
associated with less institutional activity in the pre-announcements period and a higher 
participation rate of retail investors after earnings releases. In a similar vein, Topaloglu (2003) 
finds that the reduction of effective bid-ask spread is up to 12.4% in the post-FD period for 
Nasdaq stocks. On the other hand, Sidhu, Smith, Whaley and Willis (2008) reach the opposite 
conclusion that Reg FD has curtailed the flow of information from ftrms to public capital markets 
and that private information becomes longer-lived. This indicates that privately informed traders 
have become more profitable, which is against the desired objective of Reg FD. The authors 
decompose volume-weighted effective spreads and fmd that the adverse selection cost component 
increases from 6.6% to 10.5% for a sample of NASDAQ stocks in the period surrounding the 
implementation of Reg FD (Similarly, there is about 36% increase in dollar terms). This works as 
evidence of the 'chilling effect'. Other studies find that decline in liquidity or information 
asymmetry (e.g., Straser, 2002) is insignificant or the impact is limited to a particular group of 
companies (e.g., AsIan, 2002) for Reg FD. 
Our study differs from the existing literature in that we attempt to examine how Reg FD exerts its 
effect on liquidity through institutional investors. Evidence shows that institutional investors have 
an information advantage before Reg FD. Lee (1992) uses small and large trades as proxies of 
retail and institutional trading and report that the reaction of small trades to earnings 
announcements news is weaker and slower than that of the large trades. Frankel, Johnson, and 
Skinner (1999) investigate the effect of conference calls on trading activity. They report larger 
trade size, higher trading volume, and higher return variance during conference calls, suggesting 
that institutional investors trade based on information in real time, whereas small investors are 
disadvantaged because of the lack of access to material information. 
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Although institutions are the main target of Reg FD, research on how Reg FD affects institutional 
trading behavior is rather limited. Unger (2001) summarizes the results of several surveys on the 
effectiveness of Reg FD. American Bar Association (ABA) FD Task Force Survey on securities 
attorneys shows that the percentage of clients conducting one-on-one meetings falls from 77 
before Reg FD to 27 post-Reg FD. Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) Survey #1 reports a decreasing ability to hold these meetings for both buy-side and sell-
side analysts. Topaloglu (2003) shows that institutions trade in the direction of earnings surprises 
before the announcements pre-FD, but post-FD they primarily traded after the announcement. 
Institutional trading volume is higher around earnings announcements post FD. All these results 
indicate that institutions become less informed before earnings announcements after the 
implementation of Reg FD. Chiyachantana, Jiang and Taechapiroontong (2004) report a decline 
in institutional activity before earnings announcements after Reg FD. However, there is 
anecdotal evidence that Reg FD does not eliminate institutional investors' access to non-public 
information from management (NIRI, 2001). For example, Topaloglu (2003) shows that there is 
still information leakage before the announcements in the post-FD era. Thus, whether or not and 
to what extent Reg FD changes the trading behavior of institutional investors is still unclear. We 
conjecture that the mixed results may be explained by different types of institutions. Specifically, 
Reg FD might be effective in mitigating the information advantage of a certain group of 
institutions resulting in information asymmetry, thus resulting in companies with a high level of 
holdings in improving more in liquidity. Reg FD cannot prevent other types of institutions from 
getting material information from firms, so no or less increase of liquidity is expected. 
In both parts of our study, we use Bushee's (1998) scheme to classify institutions. Bushee (1998) 
conducts factor analysis and cluster analysis to classify institutional investors in groups based on 
their past investment behavior. Institutions are sorted into three groups: transient institutions, 
quasi-indexed institutions and dedicated institutions based on two factors, including turnover and 
diversification. As a result, transient institutions display high turnover and high diversification. 
Quasi-indexed institutions show low turnover and high diversification. Dedicated institutions are 
defined as having low turnover and low diversification. Here, we interpret this scheme of 
classification as three typical trading strategies employed by institutions. 
Previous research uses the above classification scheme to study the influences of different types 
of institutions on the market and firms. For example, Bushee (1998) finds that transient 
institutions create pressure for managers to sacrifice R&D for the sake of higher current earnings. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) discover that quasi-indexers are attracted to firms with higher disclosure 
ranking practices. When firms improve disclosure practices, transient institutions immediately 
increase their holding, whereas quasi-indexers do not, leading to a significant increase in firms' 
stock return volatility. Ke and Petroni (2004) fmd that transient institutions predict the break in a 
string of consecutive quarterly earnings at least one quarter in advance of the break quarter. This 
classification scheme is also widely used in the studies ofFD. For instance, Ke, Petroni and Yu 
(2008) shows that there is reduction of transient institutions' abnormal selling before bad-news 
break in the post-FD period and Reg FD has changed the portfolio allocation of this group of 
institutions by shifting their shares away from closed-called firms. Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie 
provide evidence that cost of capital improves to a greater extent in the post-FD period for 
companies with higher transient institutional ownership. 
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In summary, we employ three different types of institutions as in Bushee (1998) in order to fmd 
support for different theoretical conjunctures and to explain conflicting empirical results in the 
previous literature. For liquidity (or illiquidity) measures, we use several measures based on the 
CRSP daily data. The first measure is the illiquidity measure initially developed by Amihud 
(2002), who estimates illiquidity as daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume, 
averaged over some period. This illiquidity measure can be interpreted as the daily price response 
associated with one dollar of trading volume, thus serving as a proxy of price impact. We also 
take market-adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure and the square root of this measure following 
Amihud (2002). The second liquidity measure we use is Gibbs Sampler estimate of trading costs 
in Roll's model (1984) and in the basic market adjusted model (Hasbrouck, 2009). In addition, we 
also use turnover and covariance estimates of Roll's model as liquidity measures. These measures 
are widely used in market microstructure studies and are proved to be highly correlated with 
intra-day liquidity measures (e.g. spread, price impact). All liquidity measures in annual 
frequency can be obtained from Hasbrouck's website. We also calculate liquidity measures in 
quarterly frequency. 
Our fmdings can be summarized as follows. For the relationship between institutional ownership 
and liquidity, we fmd that while transient institutions and quasi-indexers have positive impact on 
liquidity, dedicated institutions affect liquidity negatively and the result is robust using several 
different liquidity measures and pooled regression and fixed regression. In the second part of 
study, we fmd evidence that finns with high transient institutional ownership impact even more 
positively on liquidity after Reg FD. However, the impact ofFD on liquidity is only limited to 
transient institutions and is ineffective to reduce information advantage of other institutions, as 
firms with high ownership by quasi-indexers and dedicated institutions show either insignificant 
or opposite effect on liquidity. This result is consistent with that of Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie 
(2010), who suggest that the reduction in the cost of capital is significant for firms with high 
transient institutional ownership, but not for other institutions. In fact, we fmd that dedicated 
institutions are actually causing more information asymmetry after Reg FD. Topa10g1u (2003) 
argues that there is still some information leakage before the announcements in the post-FD era 
and so some institutions can circumvent Reg FD's intent. Straser (2002) indicates that 
information asymmetry is more serious after Reg FD. We interpret this result as that "chilling 
effect" that circumvents the amount of information distributed to the market after Reg FD and 
unexpectedly increases the information advantage of dedicated institutions. Many concurrent 
events also lead to changes in liquidity for Reg FD study during our sample period. (e.g. 
decimalization, burst of internet bubble, Sarbanes-Ox1ey Act). To control for other these factors, 
we carry out the same test for American Depositary Receipts and U.S. listed foreign firms 
(hereafter, ADRs) and use these firms as a control group, as ADRs are exempt from Reg FD but 
are subject to the same confounding factors as other U.S. firms (Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira 
2007a, 300-334). Used as a control group, ADRs can serve as a benchmark for the treatment 
group. We fmd that, in contrast to other U.S. firms, the increase of liquidity of ADRs with high 
transient institutions is insignificant. Thus, we conclude that our finding is caused by Reg FD 
instead other confounding factors. 
This study makes two contributions. First, this research contributes to a growing body of 
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literature on the relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity by showing that how 
institutions affect liquidity depends on different trading strategies institutions employ. Existing 
theoretical research generates different hypothesis on this relationship. Agency issues, regulatory 
concerns, information revealing function and competition theory suggest that institutions promote 
market liquidity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Holden and Subrahmanyam,1992, etc.), whereas 
large volume trading, herding trading, positive feedback trading, information asymmetry theory 
hold the view that institutions have negative impact on liquidity (Ho and Stoll, 1981; Easley and 
O'Hara, 1987). In this study, we classify institutional ownership using Bushee's (1998) scheme of 
three typical investment strategies used by institutions. Transient institutions are the group which 
makes active profits on short-term information or forecasts; dedicated institutions are involved in 
corporate governance and management and target on long-term profits; quasi-indexed institutions 
are based on market composition and are involved in rebalancing trading and demand liquidity 
trading. We identify these three institutions affect the liquidity differently, which can explain the 
inconsistent results from previous studies. We consider the heterogeneity across institutions as 
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there is a growing body ofliterature which shed light on this issue (Ross, 1989; Merton, 1995; 
etc.LChan and Lakonishok (1995) and Lang and McNichols (1997) further demonstrate that 
trading style matters in discussing on the influence of institutions. Furthermore, our study 
provides empirical evidence for Subrahmanyam (1991), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and 
Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) theoretical models by. We fmd transient institutions act like 
informed trader depicted in Subrahmanyam's (1991) model and have a positive impact on 
liquidity as they possess correlated precise information and compete intensely to earn short-term 
profit; Quasi-indexed institutions can represent discretionary liquidity traders in Admati and 
Pfleiderer's (1988) model; dedicated institutions are most likely to create information asymmetry, 
acting as insiders described in Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model. 
Second, our research can be cast in the stream of Reg FD studies. There are five major channels 
through which information is transmitted from internal (firm) to external (market), namely, 
through mandatory disclosure, voluntary public disclosure, selective disclosure, sell-side analyst 
and informed trader (Gomes, Gorton and Madureira 2007). Reg FD aims to eliminate selective 
disclosure by making mandatory rules and encourage firms to use public disclosure to announce 
private information. However, Reg FD in fact has unexpected impact on other channels and thus 
far, studies on the efficacy ofFD has mixed results (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Our study intends 
to contribute to the effect of Reg FD on informed trader (the fifth channel). Compared with 
studies on analysts' behaviour (Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang 2001, 2003; Gintschel and 
Markov 2004; Gomes, Gorton and Madureira 2007; Bushee Matsumoto and Miller 2004; 
Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman 2004 and etc.), research on institutional investors' 
behaviour and how institutions affect liquidity is relatively small (Ke, Petroni and Yu 2008). Our 
results lend empirical support to the view ofChiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong and Wood 
(2004) that changes in liquidity are associated with changes in institutional activities. We suggest 
that varying types of informed traders be considered in assessing whether Reg FD results in lower 
information asymmetry between infurmed traders and the public or not. In this way, we can find 
evidence to both supporting and opposing views on Reg FD. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III presents 
the theoretical arguments, the empirical methodology, and the testable hypotheses. Section IV 
describes the sample and liquidity measures. Section V reports the empirical results, robustness 
checks and analysis of these results. We conclude in Section VI. 
II. Literature Review 
2.1 Institutional Ownership and Liquidity 
Institutional investors include the depository sector (commercial banks, savings institutions and 
bank personal trust and estates), insurance companies (life, property and casualty insurances), 
pension funds (both private pension funds and state and local government employee retirement 
funds), the open-end mutual funds (excluding money market funds), and security brokers and 
dealers. 
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There is a body of knowledge in the literature that states that institutions have a positive impact 
on liquidity. First, from a functional perspective, fmancial institutions exist to provide services to 
individual investors including realizing efficiencies of evaluating financial data, lowering 
transaction cost and boosting liquidity (Merton, 1995). Grossman and Miller (1988) list 
institutional traders; stock markets such as NYSE, market makers and retail dealer market, as four 
forms of market organizations providing the immediacy functions necessary to support different 
segments of the U.S. stock market. Thereby, a greater institutional presence in the equity market 
suggests easier access to liquidity services, hence a better liquidity situation. 
High-frequency uninformed trading is the second theoretical basis to explain why institutions will 
affect liquidity positively. The frequent trading of institutions is in part a result of extensive 
portfolio rebalancing needs. On one hand, activities of institutions are governed by agency 
relations in the financial market (Ross, 1989). The compensation offered to a fund manager 
largely depends on its peer performance or comparison with a baseline benchmark (e.g., returns 
of the S&P 500). For his self interest, a fund manager will seek a strategy that makes himself 
indistinguishable from his peers and use a strategy that is a passive replication of the index 
performance. To minimize tracking errors, rebalance trade is frequently involved. This is how 
agency issues arise and lead to high-frequency trading offmancial institutions. On the other hand, 
fund managers are often required to act prudently or to perform with stability around a target 
level instead of swinging up and down. In this case, a passive strategy is a proper choice for fund 
managers. Together with the agency problem, regulation requirements also generate a large 
number of portfolio rebalancing needs of financial institutions. More importantly, such a passive 
strategy, or rebalancing trade, does not rely on private information at all. These liquidity-driven 
orders submitted by institutions reflect the liquidity needs of clients or for portfolio rebalancing 
reasons that do not add to the inventory risk or information asymmetry risk for market makers, 
who otherwise will demand significant price concessions to make the market (Admati and 
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Pfleiderer 1988). Thus, many institutions become pooling intermediaries (e.g., pension funds and 
mutual funds) and engage in passive and informless indexing or follow a constant portfolio 
allocation rule. The more institutions trade on these innocuous motives, the better the market 
liquidity situation is. 
The third theory that supports the positive impact of institutions on liquidity is the role of 
competition among institutions plays in the price discovery process. This facilitates incorporation 
of information into prices and speeds up the convergence of stock prices to their fundamentals. 
The notion is captured by several models. Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) model assumes that a 
group ofliquidity traders have discretion over the timing of their trades. Under the condition of 
homogeneous information (at the same time and in the same amount), institutions' informed 
transactions induce the participation of discretionary liquidity trading, intensify the competition 
among institutions and speed up the information revelation process. This improves market 
liquidity and results in a more beneficial situation for nondiscretionary (retail) traders. In addition, 
the multi-period auction model with multiple informed traders developed by Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) predicts an approximately strong-form efficient market even when only 
two informed traders take part in the auction procedure. Moreover, a market reveals information 
immediately when there are an infmite number of informed traders competing with each other 
perfectly. In recent studies, Mendelson and Tunca (2004) distinguish three types of information: 
tractable, intractable, and public information. He points out that informed traders take the reaction 
of liquidity traders into consideration when choosing the amount of information to acquire and to 
release. This acts as a facilitating mechanism server. Transactions initiated by insiders benefit 
liquidity traders and increase the welfare of the liquidity traders (though not optimally). 
By contract, there is a body ofliterature that has an opposing position (negative) on the role of 
institutional ownership on liquidity. Intuitively, institutional investors' dominant equity positions 
lead to frequent and bulk trades. In practice, it is difficult for large orders to be executed without 
making a large price impact. Other things being equal, block trades have a large effect on 
liquidity (Easley and O'Hara, 1987). The possible increase in inventory risk due to large order 
sizes drives market makers away from desired inventory positions when there is no private 
information and thus forces market makers to make a higher price concession, leading to lower 
liquidity (Ho and Stoll, 1981). 
The second stream of opposing theories postulates that the possible herding and positive feedback 
trading strategies from institutions and their potential to destabilize stock prices, thus reducing 
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liquidity. "Herding" refers to the pattern that investors buy and sell the same stocks at the same 
time, results in turn increases order imbalance and tightens the liquidity situation. Wermers 
summarizes four explanations for this phenomenon: institutions might suffer from reputation risk; 
receive correlated private information; infer information from other block trading; or share the 
same the preference for a certain type of stocks. Positive feedback trading, also referred to as 
return-chasing behavior, captures the investment style that buys stocks when the prices rise and 
sells when prices fall (Devenow and Welch 1996). The purchasing demand for past winners 
possibly pushes prices even higher than rational expectations and away from the fundamental 
values, eventually resulting in overreaction, destabilization of stock prices and reduction of 
market liquidity (Hong and Stein, 1999). De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) 
propose a model in which institutions (rational speculators) trigger noise traders to conduct such 
feedback trading and create price bubbles. In both settings, institutions are closely associated with 
feedback trading behavior. Many empirical studies also support the existence of either herding or 
feedback trading of institutions. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) show evidence that both herding and 
feedback trading behavior of institutional traders lead to a positive correlation between 
institutional ownership and returns. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) document sizeable returns for 
institutions that take advantage of either herding or positive feedback trading. Grinblatt, Titman 
and Wermers (1995) find a significant return-chasing behavior at the buy side only, in addition to 
weak evidence on herding. Wermers (1999) finds that herding is more likely to be observed in 
growth funds and in small stocks. 
The third opposing theory is based on the potential diminishing impact on liquidity when 
institutions gain more information than retail investors and become better informed than the rest 
of the market. This happens as institutions usually incur lower costs for access to information, 
especially when institutions, as large shareholders, take an active role in corporate monitoring or 
management. These activities unavoidably create information asymmetry problems at the expense 
of market liquidity. Kyle (1985) assumes one risk-neutral informed trader in the market and 
proves that market depth is negatively related to both the amount of private information held by 
the informed traders and the reliance on the private information by the informed traders. Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) present a model to show how bid-ask spreads arise when a group of traders 
have superior information to the rest of a specialist market. Easley and O'Hara's (1987) model 
explains why a higher transaction fee is imposed on block trades as market makers require 
compensation for the risk of transacting with informed traders. Studies also show that institutions 
are indeed the better informed group in the market. For example, Kothare and Laux (1995) 
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contend that institutions' trades convey superior information in the Nasdaq market, which 
explains wider spreads in Nasdaq than the NYSE. Typically, if institutions had an information 
advantage, they would be expected to behave differently from other investors during special event 
periods such as earnings announcements and conference calls. As abnormal behavior of 
institutions is revealed around special events, many studies address the differential behavior 
between institutions and non-institutions during these events. For example, Lee (1992) uses small 
and large trades as proxies of retail and institutional trading and reports large trades are executed 
in the right direction (buying or selling) corresponding to good or bad news events. In short, 
institutions' trading on private information adds to the risk of the market maker, raises adverse 
selection costs and impairs market liquidity. 
Some theoretical work posits that the influence of institutions on liquidity is non-monotonic. 
Subrahmanyam's (1991) model predicts that liquidity increases monotonically with the number 
of informed traders when informed traders are assumed to be risk neutral, while a unimodal 
relationship appears if informed traders are assumed to be risk-averse. Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) propose an innovative notion of discretionary liquidity traders. They demonstrate that the 
impact of ownership on liquidity depends on the degree of informativeness of market participants 
or relative informative level to market makers. In addition, other studies suggest instead of 
affecting liquidity directly, informed traders affect market liquidity by changing the information 
environment. For instance, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) find that higher institutional 
ownership induces more analysts to follow and they offer a better explanation of the impact of the 
number of analysts following on market depth. In practice, since buy-side analysts regularly 
provide institutions with information, higher institutional ownership in a firm draws more 
attention from analysts and increases the competition for information production and evaluation, 
which eventually ameliorate information asymmetries. 
Our first objective in the paper is to empirically study the impact of institutions on liquidity. The 
predicted impact on liquidity is ambiguous, so are empirical results. Researchers have shown that 
institutions cause changes to liquidity and not because institutions prefer liquid stocks (Jennings, 
Schnatterly and Seguin, 2002; Agarwal, 2007). Some studies find a positive relation between 
institutional ownership (trading) and liquidity; For example, Jennings, Schnatterly and Seguin 
(2002) use institutional holding and spread data for Nasdaq-listed firms (from the first quarter 
1983 through the third quarter of 1991) and show that both spreads and adverse selection 
components are lower for firms with higher institutional holdings. Dey and Radhakrishna (200 I ) 
document a negative correlation between net institutional trading and spreads and show that the 
13 
non-informational purpose of institutions' trading reduces order processing costs. However, the 
authors also find evidence that institutions' information-triggered trading increases the adverse 
select component of the spreads. Likewise, Sarin, Shastri and Shatri (1999) use a sample of786 
NYSE and AMEX securities listed in Value Line by year-end 1984 and fmd that spreads are 
positively related to the degree of institutional holdings (and insider holdings) and quoted depth is 
negatively associated with institutional ownership (and insider ownership). There are also studies 
that find no relation between institutional holdings and liquidity (e.g. Fabozzi, 1979; Chiang and 
Venkatesh, 1988). Consistent with some theoretical models, researchers have also detected a non-
monotonic relation. Using various liquidity measures and a intra-day sample of stocks listed on 
NYSE and AMEX from January 1983 to December 2005, Agarwal (2007) detects aU-shaped 
relation between spreads and institutional holdings providing evidence for both adverse selection 
and information efficiency effects (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Mendelson and Tunca, 
2004) of institutional trading. 
2.2 Regulation Fair Disclosure 
On October 23rd, 2000, Reg FD was implemented by the SEC Regulation. Reg FD raises many 
controversies. Proponents show lower level of information asymmetry, thus leveling the playing 
field for all investors. Skeptics argue that Reg FD will have a "chilling effect" for firms, reducing 
the quality and quantity of information flowing to the market. It is also argued that Reg FD 
impedes the efficiency of informed traders (analysts and institutions) to incorporate information 
into prices. For example, Gomes,Gorton and Madureira (2007) find that Reg FD causes a 
significant shift in analyst attention, resulting in a welfare loss for small firms that face a higher 
cost of capital and the loss of the "selective disclosure" channel for information flows. 
Furthermore, Reg FD results in greater price volatility because information is being disseminated 
without the benefit of analysis and interpretation by intermediaries such as fmancia1 analysts. 
The reasons for these conflicting statements are as follows. In addition to mandatory disclosures, 
information can be transmitted from firms to markets via four channels (Gomes, Gorton and 
Madureira 2007): (1) firms can disclose information to the public voluntarily (e.g., earnings pre-
announcements); (2) firms can selectively disclose information, e.g., phone calls, or one-on-one 
meetings; (3) "sell-side" analysts can produce research which is released to the public, e.g., 
analysts reports; and (4) private information can be produced by outsiders, "informed traders" .. 
Reg FD sought to eliminate the second channel of information flow, under the implicit 
assumption that the same information would still flow into markets but via the other channels, 
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particularly channel (1). However, the unintended consequence is that Reg FD also affects other 
channels. 
Research in the ftrst three channels ftnds positive, negative and indifferent evidence. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) point out that in making a decision on disclosure, managers aim to maximize a 
ftrm's value. Ifthe costs of changing from selective disclosure to a public release outweigh the 
beneftts, public disclosure will not be delivered and information quantity and quality will decline. 
On whether ftrms change the manner of making voluntary public disclosures in the post-FD 
period, Heflin, Subrahmanyam and Zhang (2003) examine return variability around earnings 
announcements and ftnd a signiftcant reduction of price deviations in the event window due to the 
regulation. This implies an increasing quality and quantity of information dissemination through 
public disclosures after October 2000. Bailey, Li, Mao and Zhong (2003) show that after taking 
decimalization of stock market into consideration, return volatility did not experience a 
signiftcant change, whereas trading volume increased after FD takes into effect. They also 
provide evidence that corporations increase the quantity of voluntary disclosures, but the increase 
is limited only to forthcoming quarterly earnings. Selective disclosure is distributed through 
channels such as one-on-one meetings with analysts and (earnings) conference calls. To answer 
the question whether Reg FD reduces selective disclosure, researchers exam the change of the 
level of information asymmetry, especially that related to selective disclosure events. Straser 
(2002) constructs the adverse selection component of spreads according to Huang and Stoll's 
(1997) method, and fmds that while the quantity of public disclosure (8K Form ftlings) increases, 
the quality is lowered as information asymmetry rises after Reg FD. Sunder (2002) separates 
firms that hold conference calls from firms that do not, and finds that the difference in spreads, 
which exists before Reg FD, disappear in the post-FD period. This serves as evidence of a 
decrease in information asymmetry around conference calls for firms that employed restricted 
disclosure practices before the regulation. Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2004) 
show a decreased information asymmetry component of spreads during the earnings 
announcements. Collver (2007) constructs an informativeness statistic using Hasbrouck's (1991) 
model and shows a decrease in informed trading, but the decrease is attributed more to 
decimalization on the NYSE than to Reg FD; Also, there is a concentrated stream ofliterature 
that aims to examine the change of analyst groups, one of the major targets of Reg FD. Similarly, 
Heflin, Subrahmanyam, and Zhang (2001, 2003) study whether Reg FD is associated with 
changes in the information environment prior to earnings announcements by comparing market 
activity in the pre- and post- FD periods. After controlling for non-FD factors, they find no 
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reliable evidence of changes in various aspects of analysts forecast bias, accuracy and dispersion 
around earning announcements. Bailey et al. (2003) [md no increase in the analysts' accuracy in 
forecasting quarterly earnings, but [md more difference in opinions among analysts on earnings 
beyond the current quarter. Using a sample for analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations 
from October 23rd, 1999 to October 23rd, 2001, Gintschel and Markov (2004) discover that the 
average price impact of analysts' opinion is reduced by 28% in the post-FD period and this 
change is more significant for prestigious brokerage houses and optimistic analysts, who are 
supposed to have had privileged access to information before Reg FD. Mohamam and Sunder 
(2006) find that some analysts from large brokerage houses lose their forecasting superiority due 
to Reg FD, implying that Reg FD has served its intended purpose. They also show an increase in 
the number of firms followed by analysts and a switch from analysts' reliance on common 
information to idiosyncratic information. This study starts from the overall liquidity change 
caused by Reg FD, focuses on channel (4) and examines the impact of Reg FD on different 
groups of institutional investors. We attempt to determine to figure out whether Reg FD improves 
liquidity by mitigating the information advantage of institutional investors, and whether Reg FD 
impedes institutional investors to incorporate information into stock prices. We extend the 
current literature in two ways. 
First, for all the above channels, studies on informed traders per se are rather limited. Limited 
literature on this aspect include Topaloglu's (2003) research, which uses the sample of negative 
earnings surprises in Nasdaq firms from May 2 to June 2001 and detects institutional buying 
activity both before and after positive earnings surprises is relatively higher after Reg FD than 
before. However, an informed trader is an important subject associated with the study of 
disclosure. Bushee and Noe (2000) argue that disclosure rankings affect the composition of 
company stock held by institutions and that disclosure has an impact on stock volatility through 
institutions' choice of portfolios. Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2009) point out that in making 
a decision of whether to make a disclosure or not, firms consider reducing the information 
asymmetry among uninformed investors and better informed investors as an important benefit of 
disclosure. Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie (2010) note that the cost of capital decreased after Reg FD 
and the decrease is generally significant for firms with characteristics indicative of more severe 
selective disclosure before Reg FD. One of the characteristics is the high percentage of transient 
ownership. In this study, we adopt Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie's methodology to exam the change in 
liquidity caused by institutional behaviors. This perspective is different from the studies that 
focus on analysts groups, and so is novel in our study 
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Second, previous studies show an increased level of market liquidity (measured by volume, 
spread, or market depth) or a decrease in information asymmetry. Eleswarapu, Thompson and 
Venkataraman (2004) fmd that the adverse selection component of spreads during earning 
announcement events is reduced significantly in the post-FD period. Several other studies 
including the aforementioned Sunder (2002), Collver's (2007) papers, all record either the shift of 
spreads or a certain component of spreads. However, most of these studies address the reduction 
of information asymmetry without providing a further explanation of how the information 
environment has changed after Reg FD. One of the few exceptions is the Chiyachantana, Jiang, 
Taechapiroontong and Wood's (2004) study, which examines earnings announcements in a 
sample ofNYSE firms from November 1999 to July 2001. They fmd that Reg FD is associated 
with a decrease in the institutional investors' trading volume, and Reg FD is associated with a 
significant decline in institutional trading for thirteen hours around the earnings announcements 
period, particularly in the pre-announcement period (thirteen hours prior). Their results are a basis 
for our study, as they connect the decline in information asymmetry in the pre-announcement 
period with lower institutional trading and associate lower information risk in the event period 
with a higher participation of retail investors after announcements post-FD. In this study, we 
choose a longer period of sample to examine Reg FD effects, not just the earnings announcements 
period. We make the conjecture that before FD, market makers increase the spreads because of 
the risk of trading with informed traders. If information is simultaneously delivered to all 
investors, as is the intention of Reg FD, information asymmetry among market participants 
should be smaller. We show evidence that the change is through a particular group of institutional 
investors, which is one of main focuses of Reg FD. 
2.3 Institutions Classification 
Institutions have different features and trade differently. Previous studies classify institutions 
according different standards. For example, Ross (1989) classifies institutions into transparent, 
translucent and opaque ones depending on their ability to reflect retail forces. Merton (1995) 
extends this classification, listing the government bond market, stock market, future and option 
market as transparent, unit trusts, mutual funds, pension funds, and fmance companies as 
translucent; and insurance companies, and commercial banks as opaque institutions. Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995) sort institutions according to their investment styles. To account for the 
possibility that there can be substantive differences in trading and governance behavior for 
different types of institutions, Lang and McNichols (1997) group institutions based on whether 
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the institutions' incentives to trade on performance is strong or weak. According to their 
classification, banks, insurance companies, investment advisers and investment companies belong 
to the strong group, whereas colleges and universities, private foundation and private and public 
pension funds belong to the weak group. They record significant differences in portfolio turnover 
and earnings-based trading. Other studies document the behaviours and effects on various aspects 
of institutions across various types. For example, Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) state that 
investment advisers and investment companies make up the group of "potentially active" 
institutions with lower cost monitoring, and that they have stronger influence on monitoring 
executive compensations. Woidtke (2002) shows that firm value is positively related to 
ownership by private pension funds but is negatively associated with public pension funds. 
Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) conclude that rather than exerting effort to influence management, 
some institutional investors "vote with their feet" by selling their shares when they are 
dissatisfied with corporate performance. 
Bushee (1998) proposes a new classification scheme. Institutions are classifies classified into 
three groups according to trading frequency, portfolio diversification and momentum strategy 
(The momentum factor is omitted in later studies). He shows that managers are less likely to cut 
R&D expenses when the investor base is dominated by dedicated or quasi-indexer institutions, 
but this is not case if the investor base is dominated by transient institutions. Bushee (1999) tests 
whether institutional investors focus more on expected near-term earnings rather than on long-run 
value (defmed as any holding of more than four years). He finds transient institutions exhibit 
strong preferences for corporations with more value in expected near-term earnings and less in 
long-run value, while institutions as a whole do not exhibit a short-term focus on earnings. This 
classification is widely employed by other researchers. For example, Hribar et al. (2004) show 
that transient institutional investors sell shares in restating firms one quarter before accounting 
restatements. This could be due to either the transient institutional investors' superior ability in 
predicting accounting restatements, or their access to firms' executives who provide them with 
private information on accounting restatements. 
We hypothesize that different types of institutions influence liquidity differently and Reg FD 
affects different types of institutions to a different extent. , Our hypothesis is based on by several 
previous studies. Jennings, Schnatterly and Seguin (2002) detect heterogeneous relations between 
institutional ownership and liquidity across the various types. They find that the negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and spreads is the strongest for commercial banks 
and insurance companies, while there is no discernible relation between spreads and holdings of 
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pension funds, foundations, endowments and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). They 
point out that the heterogeneity is consistent with the notion that the impact on the informational 
environment of institutional ownership depends crucially on the nature of the institutions. 
Following Bushee's classification scheme, Ke, Petroni and Yu (2008) show pre-FD transient 
institutions exhibit abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter prior to bad news breaks and this 
abnormal selling is confined to conference call firms. Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie (2010) also find 
that Reg FD lowered the cost of capital more in firms with higher transient institutional holdings. 
We will test all three categories of institutions and examine whether these institutions respond to 
Reg FD differently. 
III. Methodology, Theory and Hypotheses 
3.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
The role played by investor institutions has been a question of substantial interest to studies on 
liquidity and Reg FD. We develop a hypothesis to test empirically the impact of institutions on 
liquidity and the impact of Reg FD on liquidity through institutional behavior. We argue that 
institutions are not a homogeneous group and by classifying institutions based on strategies they 
use, conflicting theories and empirical results can be reconciled and explained. 
The first part of hypotheses tests the impact of institutions on liquidity. On one hand, several 
theories suggest that institutional investors may promote liquidity. Their efficient acquisition and 
precise interpretation of information help the market reveal the information withheld by insiders, 
thus reducing information asymmetry. Competition among informed traders enables institutions 
to exert a positive influence on liquidity. Mendelson and Tunca (2004) construct a variant of 
Kyle's (1985) one-period model with a single informed investor in a multi-period model and 
endogenize liquidity trading and classify information into three types. Their model predicts that 
even if the acquisition cost is zero, informed traders might not choose to acquire all of the private 
information available. The authors also indicate that with more informed trading, as prices reflect 
more information about the security's value, thus reducing the risk and promoting liquidity. In 
other words, the utility of liquidity traders is higher with the existence of informed trader than 
without it._Subrahmanyam (1991) considers the case where that both informed traders and market 
makers are risk averse, and shows that increasing the degree of information asymmetry can 
improve market liquidity when the number of informed traders is large, as informed traders could 
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interpret information more precisely. Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) introduce concepts such as strategic uninformed traders in Kyle's (1985) 
framework and predict that competition among informed traders improve market liquidity. Thus, 
we make the following hypothesis. 
Hl(a): Institutional ownership is associated with higher liquidity 
On the other hand, institutions' large trading volume and information privilege add inventory 
risk, or adverse selection risk, to market makers and they have the potential and power to 
destabilize stock prices. Thus, the rebuttal to the above argument is that institutional ownership 
has a negative impact on liquidity. Ho and Stoll (1981) demonstrate a model with a single dealer 
in a single stock, facing a stochastic demand for his services, and find that bid-ask spreads 
increase with transaction size. Easley and O'Hara's model (1987) link the effect oflarge-sized 
trading with informed trading. They posit that large transaction size, presumably originated by 
institutions, is associated with wider spreads, and information asymmetry alone can explain the 
result. Kyle (1985) indicates that under the setting of a single risk neutral insider, random noise 
traders, and risk neutral market makers, market depth is inversely proportional to the amount of 
private information of the insider and the intensity of insider trading is based on private 
information. Assuming that specialists have unlimited inventory and the inventory cost is zero, 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) establish a model to demonstrate that information-based trades 
widen bid-ask spreads by increasing ask prices and decreasing bid prices, because spreads might 
cause realized returns to be overestimated relative to observed returns. This leads us to the second 
hypothesis. 
Hl(b): Institutional ownership is associated with lower liquidity 
We further study the institution-liquidity relationship by classifying institutions into transient, 
quasi-indexed and dedicated types following Bushee's (1998) scheme. These are three typical 
strategies employed by large institutions and that may have varying impact of institutional 
ownership on liquidity. 
First, transient institutions are featured by high turnover and high diversification. They do have 
any information advantage. For example, Ke and Petroni (2004) found evidence that transient 
institutions can obtain information regarding the impending break from private communications 
with management and can predict earnings breaks at least one quarter in advance of the break 
quarter. However, Bushee and Noe (2000) characterize this group of institutions as trading 
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aggressively based on a short-term strategy. It is justifiable to conjecture that the speed of 
transient institutions' incorporating information into price is fast and at a high frequency. Ke and 
Ramaliangegowda (2005) find current earnings are a harbinger of future earnings. This is 
reflected in the current price for firms with larger proportion of transient institutional holdings, 
which provides evidence of the accurate interpretation of information by transient institutions. As 
Subramanyam (1991) states "the precision of private information may improve terms of trades 
(market liquidity) because risk-averse traders who are precisely informed compete more 
aggressively than those who are imprecisely informed". Besides, previous studies show that this 
group of institutions is one of the subjects of selective disclosure (e.g., Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie, 
2010) and respond to similar information such as quarterly disclosures and earning 
announcements (e.g. ,Ke and Ramaliangegowda, 2005; Ke, Petroni and Yu, 2008). Thus we note 
that they are also a good representative group of informed traders who face intense competition, 
incorporate information into stock prices quickly and receive highly correlated information. 
Consistent with the work by Subrahmanyam (1991), Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), Holden 
and Subrahmanyam (1992), Back, Cao and Willard (2000), we conjecture that intensified 
competition among informed traders and correlated signais have a positive impact on liquidity. 
Thus, we make the following hypothesis. 
H2: Transient institutional ownership is associated with higher liquidity 
Dedicated institutions are featured by low turnover and low diversification, which are opposite 
features of transient institutions. They represent the group of institutions that represent a 
"relationship" approach to investing (Porter, 1993). These institutions are supposed to participate 
in corporate management, hold block shares of stock and material information compared with 
other institutions. In a capital market in which information is heterogeneous and information 
collection and processing are costly, we believe that this group of investors are most likely to 
possess private information and to conduct insider trading. They are the group of institutions that 
are most aligned to the profile of informed traders who create information asymmetry as in Easley 
and O'Hara (1987) or Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model. Unlike transient institutions, 
dedicated institutions focus on different companies and their trades induce diverse private 
information into the market. As Spiegel and Subrahmanyam's (1992) model suggests, with 
diverse signals in the market, liquidity decreases with the number of informed traders. 
Additionally, because they have low turnover, they should cause lower liquidity. Therefore, we 
make the hypothesis: 
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H3: Dedicated institutional ownership is associated with lower liquidity 
The third group of institutions is a quasi-indexer, which makes up 70 percent of all institutions. 
They are featured by low portfolio turnover, high diversification. Many reasons such as 
regulatory concerns and agency issues prompt institutions to engage in strategies such as passive 
indexing or fixed ratio asset allocation targeting. These strategies generate a substantial amount 
of portfolio rebalancing trading. This implies that the higher the aggregate institutional 
ownership, the more active the trades are and hence more liquid the market becomes. 
Furthermore, their trading is associated with liquidity demand instead of private information. This 
strategy is prevalent among institutions like public pension funds and bank trusts, which have 
substantial amounts to invest and/or lack the resources to actively manage their portfolios. 
Admati and Pleiderer (1988) depict a group of discretionary liquidity traders in their model, who 
have liquidity needs and possess the right to determine when to trade. They argue that the 
assumption of nondiscretionary liquidity traders in Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) and Kyle's 
(1985) framework is unrealistic, especially when large institutions also have demand for liquidity 
and liquidity trading generally improves the efficiency of the market. Admati and Pleiderer 
(1988) forecast that the existence of discretionary liquidity traders induces more trading volume 
while at the same time not impeding the price discovery process. The quasi-indexers are such 
discretionary liquidity traders and we conjecture: 
H4: Quasi-indexed institutional ownership is associated with higher liquidity 
The second part of our study addresses Regulation FD. Unlike the works of Kyle (1985), Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and Admati and Plfeiderer (1988), the theoretical work of Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) assumes that the risk bearing capacity of market makers is limited. Their 
model suggests that a greater amount of disclosure reduces price impact and improves stock 
liquidity. Verrecchia (2001) suggests that companies make public disclosures as the release of 
information purports to reduce the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. 
Researchers also provide empirical support for Diamond and Verrecchia's position. For example, 
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) provide evidence that an increase in disclosure ratings is 
followed by an increase in stock liquidity. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) also study a regulation 
change, i.e., the switch from German to an international reporting regime of German firms and 
detect a reduction in spreads after the change with more information disclosed. The intention of 
FD is to encourage companies to make more public disclosures instead of selective disclosures, 
and the impact of this regulation in spreads and information asymmetry is provided by Collver 
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(2007), Sundar (2002) and Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2004) Reg FD also 
intends to provide equal access to firm disclosures. Topaloglu (2003) observes a change in 
institutional behavior. While institutional investors are targeted by Reg FD, the question remains 
is whether the change of liquidity is related to change in the behaviour of these investors? This is 
the question we try to answer. Mendelson and Tunca (2004) demonstrate that when the amount of 
intractable information is small, informed traders choose to acquire and release all information. 
And voluntary disclosure, under this circumstance, improves market liquidity. Bushee and Noe's 
result (2001) also indicates that disclosure has an indirect impact on the market through 
institutions. Chiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong and Wood's study (2004) of Reg FD links 
the improvement in liquidity with lower institutional activities. We can infer from these studies to 
make the statement that informed traders are a channel through which disclosure affects the term 
of the market. Is Reg FD effective in reducing the adverse selection effect of institutional 
investors? If it is, we will find support for the following hypothesis: 
H5: The improvement of liquidity is greater for firms with high institutional ownership 
afterRegFD 
While the above hypothesis is reasonable, other models and theories make counter arguments. For 
example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that sometimes disclosures may result in 
undesirable results such as driving out market makers and worsening the liquidity situation. 
Mendelson and Tunca (2004) argue that voluntary information disclosure does not always benefit 
the welfare of liquidity traders, especially when the amount of "intractable" information is large. 
As mentioned before, there are mixed findings on the implications of Reg FD. In particular, there 
is dispute on whether Reg FD effectively improves liquidity. Straser (2002) even detects a rise in 
information asymmetry after the regulation. However, evidence shows that Reg FD reduces the 
information advantage of transient institutional investors significantly. Ke, Petroni and Yu (2008) 
investigate the impact of Reg FD on trading behaviour of transient institutional investors prior to 
a bad news break in a string of consecutive earnings increase. They fmd that while transient 
institutional investors engage in abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter immediately preceding a 
bad news break in pre-FD period, but they no longer can do so in the post-FD period. Chen, 
Dhaliwal and Xie (2010) fmd that the cost of equity capital declines more for frrms with high 
transient institutional holdings, while the change is not significant for firms with high non-
transient institutional holdings. So we propose that the improvement ofliquidity is greater for 
firms with high transient institutional holding than firms with high quasi-indexed institutional 
holdings or dedicated institutional holdings. Because quasi-indexed institutions do not rely on 
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private infonnation, we conjecture that Reg FD does not (or did not) significantly affect their 
behaviours. For dedicated investors, Reg FD does not effectively impede them from obtaining 
more infonnation from finns, because they typically participate in the management of these finns. 
Therefore, we make the following three hypotheses which suggest that the impact of Reg FD is 
limited to only a group of, but not all of, the institutional investors. 
H6: The improvement of liquidity is greater for fIrms with high transient institutional 
holdings 
H7: The improvement of liquidity is not significant for firms with high dedicated 
institutional holdings 
H8: The improvement of liquidity is not significant for fIrms with high ownership of quasi-
indexers 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Institution Classification 
Recently, academic research has begun to examine whether there are systematic differences in 
how different types of institutional investors influence the stock market and the decisions of 
corporate managers. Agarwal (2007) shows that liquidity increases with a shift in holdings from 
long-term to short tenn investors and decreases with risk aversion of institutions. Jennings, 
Schnatterly and Seguin (2002) document the heterogeneous relation between institutional 
ownership and liquidity across types of institutions. They discover that only commercial banks 
and insurance companies have significantly negative impact on spreads. Thus, it is reasonable to 
believe that different groups of institutional investors have different impacts on liquidity. In this 
paper, we employ Bushee's (1998, 2001) taxonomy of institutional investors. Bushee uses factor 
analysis and cluster analysis to classify institutional investors into groups based on their past 
investment behavior. 
Initially Bushee (1998) conducted factor analysis. Bushee (1998) constructs nine variables that 
describe the past investment behavior of institutional investors based on prior research, among 
which four variables are proxy for the level of portfolio diversification of each institution, two are 
turnover measures of institutional trading and the other three are variables to measure the 
institution's trading sensitivity to current earnings (momentum factors). Principal factor analysis 
with oblique rotation is conducted to identify three factors. These three factors capture average 
size of the institution's stake in its portfolio finns, portfolio turnover and the degree of 
momentum trading respectively. However, the momentum variables were dropped in Bushee 
(2001). 
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Secondly, Bushee conducts cluster analysis on factor scores to obtain the fmal separation of 
institutions into groups. This was to group institutions into clusters so that institutions are more 
similar to institutions in the same cluster than they are to institutions in other clusters. Finally, 
institutional investors are sorted into three categories: transient institutions, quasi-indexed 
institutions and dedicated institutions according to two important metrics: portfolio turnover and 
diversification. Transient institutions are characterized by highest portfolio turnover and high 
diversification; dedicated institutions exhibit low portfolio turnover and low diversification (high 
concentration); while, quasi-indexer institutions have low portfolio turnover and high 
diversification. 
3.2.2 Test of relation between institutional ownership and liquidity hypotheses (HI to H4) 
To test hypotheses HI through H4 on the influence institutional ownership on finn's liquidity, we 
regress total ownership and classified ownership variables on liquidity measures. 
Liqit = 0i + Ot + (}INS + Ylretit + Y2retlaUit + Y3prclnit + Y4sizeit (1) 
+ Ysprcsqit + Y6volumeit + Y7volatilitYit + Yanumtrdit 
+ €it 
Liqit = 0i + Ot + (}lTRA it + (}2QIXit + (}3DEDit + Ylretit + Y2retlaUit (2) 
+ Y3prclnit + Y4sizeit + Ysprcsqit + Y6volumeit 
+ Y7volatilitYit + Yanumtrdit + €it 
where INS, TRA, QIX and DED are total institutional ownership percentages, transient institutional 
ownership percentage, quasi-indexed institutional ownership percentage and dedicated 
institutional ownership percentage for fIrm i at time t respectively. Although, we do not have a 
clear forecast of (), we expect to detect that (}1 > 0, (h > 0 and (}3 < O. The regression is 
conducted on both quarterly and annual data, both pooled regression and fixed-effect regression. 
0i denotes industry dummies according to the Kenneth French's industry classification scheme, 
while Ot denotes annual/quarter dummies. We also include several control variables in the 
regression. retit is the return of stock i over the period 1. retlaUit represents the return of stock 
i over the last time period, t-1. prclUit is the log price of stock i at the end of time period 1. We 
multiply outstanding shares at time t by the corresponding price of stock i to obtain the total 
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market capitalization offrrms, sizeit. prcsqit is square of price of stock i at the end oftime t. 
volumeit is the sum of trading volume of stock i over time period t. volatilitYit is calculated by 
variance of returns of stock i over time period t. numtrdit denotes the total number of trades 
number over time period t. 
3.2.3 Test ofthe FD hypotheses (H5 to H8) 
Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie (2010) discover that the cost of capital declines in the post-FD period 
relative to pre-FD period and the decrease is mainly for medium and large firms. this decrease is 
more significant for firms with characteristics that lead to selective disclosure in the pre-FD 
period. High transient institutional holdings are one of these characteristics. Significant decline in 
the cost of capital does not happen for small frrms being firms with high non-transient 
institutional holdings and American Depositary Receipts. To test the hypotheses H5 to H8, we 
refer to Chen et aI's (2010) Difference-in-differences models on the effect of the FD on liquidity. 
Our variable of interest is PostFDit * Zit, while Zit represents INS, TRA, QIX and DED of stock 
i in quarter t respectively. If the coefficient on PostFDit * Zit is significantly negative, this 
suggests that the increase in liquidity in post FD is greater for firms with high Z. If Reg FD doe 
have an overall influence on and does mitigate the information advantage of all institutions, a4 
should be significantly negative when Zit is total institutional ownership. According to the 
hypotheses, we expect to observe significantly negative a4 when Z refers to transient institutional 
holdings and less significant or positive a4 when Z represents quasi-indexed or dedicated 
institutional holdings. 
IV. Sample Construction and Data Description 
We construct both annual and quarterly sample. We obtain data from the CRSP daily data file 
first, and then formulate annual measures. The annual sample includes all frrm-years between 
1995 and 2005 with available liquidity data from Hasbrouck's website. This data is restricted to 
ordinary common shares (CRSP share code 10 or 11) that have a valid price for the last trading 
day of the year, and have no changes oflisting venues or large splits within the last 3 months of 
the year (Hasbrouck, 2009). The sample period is also restricted by the availability of institutional 
holdings data and the requirement of two years of data from which to calculate portfolio 
characteristics of institutions. At the end, we obtain 51,492 observations (4,681 x 11 on average). 
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The quarterly sample also spans over the period 1995~2005. We get original data from the CRSP 
daily data file and form quarterly measures. This sample is also restricted by the availability of 
institutional holdings data and the requirement of two years of data from which to calculate 
portfolio characteristics of institutions. We make the assumption that institutions do not change 
their strategy during a year. As a result, there are 208,229 observations (approximately 4,732x44 
panel data sample), among which 200,383 are data of U.S. firms and 7,846 are American 
Depositary Receipts and foreign firms (ADRs). The FD was formally proposed by SEC on 
December 20,1999, approved on August 10th, 2000, and went into effect on October 23rd, 2000. 
We define the first quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 2000 as prior-FD period, while the 
fourth quarter of2000 to fourth quarter of2005 as post-FD period. The sample period is longer 
than most studies of the FD, but is similar to that of Be, Petroni and Yu's (2008) research on how 
the FD changed the behavior of transient institutions. Furthermore, we use the American 
Depository Receipts to control for compounding effects. 
4.1 Main variables 
4.1.1 Institutional Ownership 
We obtained the institutional holdings data from the University of Michigan Spectrum database, 
which includes the all Thomson Reuters Institutional (13-f) Holdings database (Spectrum) for the 
period 1995 and 2005. The SEC Rule 13-f specifies that all institutions managing more than $100 
million in equity must file a quarterly report listing all equity holdings that are greater than 
10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. Thus, for each firm total institutional holdings are 
defined as the sum of all end-of-calendar-quarter holdings by fund managers filing 13-f forms on 
the firm. The total outstanding shares are collected from CRSP Daily NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ files for accuracy, as share outstanding data in Spectrum are rounded to millions. 
Using Bushee's classification scheme, we calculate the total institutional ownership, transient 
institutional ownership, quasi-indexer ownership, and dedicated institutional ownership for every 
firm at the end of each quarter. 
4.l.2 Liquidity 
We use several liquidity measures. Amihud's (2002) study employs for each stock i the average 
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Where Dit is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in the period t. IRitd I is 
the absolute return on stock i on day d of period t and VOLDitd is the respective daily volume in 
dollars. This ratio gives the absolute (percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading, or daily 
price impact of the order flow. Here, the time period refers to either quarter or year. 
We also calculate the average market illiquidity across stocks in each time period as 
where Nt is the number of stocks in time period t. Then the mean-adjusted value is 
amhSqit = .J amht, the square root of amhit is used to correct the skewness. 
Roll(1984) model suggests 
where m t is the log quote midpoint prevailing prior to the tth trade, Pt is the log trade price, and 
the qt are direction indicators, which take the values + I (for a buy) or -I (for a sale) with equal 
probability. Since the model applies to transaction prices, c is viewed as the effective cost 
which implies 
where llPt is the price change and qt refers to transaction direction. Using daily data, there are 
two ways to estimate this model. The first one is deducted from the above equation as 
where Cov(IlPt, llPt-l) is the first-order auto-covariance of the price changes. Hasbrouck (2009) 
estimates annual measures according to this methodology, cmz and cmzAlt. cmz is the moment 
estimate of c, based on all reported prices, including quote midpoints. cmzAlt is the moment 
estimate of c, excluding quote midpoints. For quarterly measure, we estimate roll based on this 
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model. In the process of calculation, we include quote midpoints and treat positive covariance as 
zero. As noted, there are two problems associated with this moment estimate. First, CRSP assigns 
negative mid quote as the price for a stock if the no trades occur during the day. Second, fIrst-
order auto-covariance might be positive. The simplest way to solve the former problem is to 
assign zero in positive cases. 
To address these two problems, Hasbrouck (2009) proposes the Gibbs Sampler estimation and 
then test the validity of the estimates. To improve the estimate of trading costs, Hasbouck (2009) 
applies Gibbs Sampler estimation to the basic market-adjusted model: 
r mt is the market return. Appendix shows the details of the Gibbs Sampler estimation. 
4.2 Control Variables 
When testing the impact of institutional ownership on liquidity, several variables are used to 
control other factors which might influence the liquidity, as indicated in previous studies. These 
control variables can be calculated using data from Center for Research in Security Prices 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) addresses the issue of small fIrm effect and show evidence that 
transaction costs decrease as fIrm size increases. This is not only because smaller fIrms trade less 
frequently but also because there is more information available about large fIrms (through media 
and analyst coverage) in the market. Amihud (2002) also shows that smaller fIrms demonstrate 
stronger illiquidity effects. Thus, we include size offrrm as one of the control variables (shares 
outstanding times price). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) prove the positive relation between 
return and illiquidity both theoretically and empirically. High volatility is associated with high 
uncertainty, which also increase the risk of holding inventory borne by market makers. Chordia, 
Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) document the change of spreads with equity market returns and 
market volatility. Therefore, return (ret) and volatility are both control variables and we calculate 
volatility as the variance of daily closing returns. Lagged return, retlag, is added as a control 
variable to isolate the effect of the herding behaviour or feedback trading from information-
related effects, as institutions respond to past performance by chasing trends (Nofsinger & Sias, 
1999; Wermers, 1999). Stock price reflects information and a number of studies showed that 
price explains variation in spread (Choi & Shastri, 1989; Sarin,Shastri &Shastri, 1999). Here, we 
use the natural logarithm of price as one control variable. The price squared variable,prcsq, is to 
control for any nonlinear relation between price and liquidity. For example, Jennings, Schnatterly 
and Seguin (2002) contend that liquidity increases with price but at a decreasing rate. Theoretical 
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work (e.g. Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988) shows that trading volume is positively associated with 
how informed the trader is. However, another stream of work shows that a larger size of 
transaction does not imply more information contained. On the contrary, informed traders break 
their large volume demand into medium sized trades to disguise them as liquidity traders and 
make "stealth trading" (Barclay & Warner, 1993; Alexander &Peterson, 2007). Jones, Kaul and 
Lipson (1994) propose that trading volume does not contain information beyond number of 
As both trading size and number of trades might have impacts on information and liquidity, we 
include volume and numtrd as control variables. 
V. Empirical Evidence and Robustness Checks 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics ofliquidity measures, institutional ownership (total and 
classified) and control variables. The means of annual amh, c_BMA and cmz are 3.5146, 0.0110, 
and 0.0.102. The median of annual amh, c_BMA and cmz are 0.0993, 0.0067 and 0.0064. These 
are similar to Hasbrouck's (2009) summary statistics. The means of annual TRA yct, DED yct 
and QIXyct are 0.1180, 0.1019 and 0.1961. Similarly, in quarterly data, the means are 0.1101, 
0.0982 and 0.1885. We conclude that while transient institutional ownership and dedicated 
institutional ownership are close to each other, average quasi-indexed ownership percentage 
exceeds the other two types. 
In the correlation matrix, we can see that liquidity measures are correlated as they are expected to. 
For example, in the annual correlation matrix, the correlation coefficient between amh and 
c_BMA is 0.52. For quarterly data, the coefficient between amh_ma and tnov is negative. Panel B 
and Panel C also present the correlation coefficients between liquidity and institutional ownership 
percentage. We notice that for annual data, the coefficients between INS yct and trading cost 
measures are negative, which suggests that, in general, institutions have a positive impact on 
liquidity. As expected in Bushee's (1998) classification scheme, the coefficients between 
TRAyct and tnov are positive (0.24 annually and 0.15 quarterly), QIXyct and tnov also have 
positive correlation coefficients (0.09 annually and 0.04 quarterly), whereas DED yct and tnov 
have negative correlation coefficients in both annual and quarterly data. This is a proof that 
Bushee's classification is valid for quarterly frequency and under the assumption that institutions 
use consistent strategies throughout a calendar year. 
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5.2 The impact of institutional ownership on liquidity 
As a homogenous group, how do institutions influence liquidity? Table 2 displays results ofEq. 
(1) using annual data and Table 3 displays results ofEq. (1) using quarterly data. Both tables 
support Hypothesis 1 (a) instead of Hypothesis 1 (b). INSyct is negatively associated with trading 
cost measures and positively related to stock turnover. These relations remain unchanged after 
adding industry and time controls. These results show that institutions facilitate the process of 
price discovery, improve the welfare of liquidity traders and serve as empirical arguments for 
prior studies (e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Mendelson and Tunca, 2004). Agarwal 
(2007) detects both adverse selection and information efficiency effects of institutions on 
liquidity, while we contend the latter is the dominant effect. 
However, after classifying institutions according to Bushee's (1998) scheme, we also fmd 
evidence of adverse selection effect in one particular type of institution. We examine the impact 
of classified institutional ownership on liquidity using Eq. (3). Table 4 and Table 5 show the 
results for annual and quarterly data, respectively. Hasbrouck (2009) states that the CRSP/Gibbs 
estimate of trading costs achieves high correlation with TAQ estimate (0.965). Moreover, adding 
other explanatory variables aids in allocating transaction price changes between "true" (efficient 
price) returns and transient trading costs. This makes the basic market-adjusted model superior to 
Roll's model (1984) by adding market return as an additional regressor. Therefore, first we 
analyze the results using c_BMA as liquidity measure. Table 4 Panel A presents the fmding from 
the pooled regressions. The coefficients of TRAyct (-0.0120, t= -6.336) and QIXyct (-0.0104, t= 
-3.432) are significantly negative, suggesting that transient institutional ownership and quasi-
indexed ownership reduce trading costs. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) incorporate, into 
Kyle's(1984) model, a group of liquidity traders who are uninformed and have discretionary to 
decide the timing to trade. The existence of large institutions justifies this innovation. These 
traders increased trading volumes and do not affect the information capacity of the price 
discovery process. This is a proper depiction of quasi-indexers, as their strategy is passive and 
they do not rely on private information. Our result of quasi-indexers' impact on liquidity is 
consistent with the prediction of the model. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) also contend that informed trading based on correlated signals 
would induce uninformed trading, thus improving the liquidity. Subrahmanyam's (1991) model 
also implies that liquidity will be improved with competition between precisely informed traders. 
Ke and Potroni (2004) point out transient institutional investors obtain information to predict a 
break in consecutive increases in earnings. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) find evidence that 
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transient institutions exploit information from post-earnings announcement drift to make better 
future earnings forecast. Xue and Zhang (2008) discover that transient institutions trade on 
fundamental signals. All these previous studies imply that transient institutional investors conduct 
short-term transactions and rely on highly correlated signals and interpret information better than 
the public. On the other hand, the coefficient dedicated institutional ownership on trading cost is 
significantly positive (0.0026, t=4.613). This is consistent with our previous hypothesis that 
dedicated institutions possess private information as insiders and this is the group of institutions 
that create information asymmetry. As captured by Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model, the 
presence of insiders leads to the increase of the bid-ask spread. Our result remains unchanged 
after adding industry controls, as coefficients on TRAyet, QIXyet andDED yet are -0.0116 (t= 
-4.407), -0.0108 (t= -4.126) and 0.002 (t= 3.448), respectively. 
More trading cost measures and quarterly data are used to check the robustness of the results. 
Amihud's illiquidity measures (amh, amh_ma and amh_sq) show similar results with those in 
previous paragraph. Almost all coefficients of TRA yet, and QIX yet are negative, however, for 
DED yet, most coefficients are either positive or insignificant. For instance, using amh _ ma as 
another liquidity measure, with a 1 % increase in transient (quasi-index) institutional ownership, 
trading costs decrease significantly by 32.36% (14.75%). Table 5 show similar results using 
quarterly measures. For example, in pooled regressions (Table 5 Panel A), coefficients of amh on 
TRAyet, QIXyet andDEDyet are -2.28 (t= -4.766), -0.8181(t= -1.800) and 1.2695 (t= 2.195). 
After controlling for both time and industry effects, there is still supporting evidence, which show 
the different effects for different types of institutional ownership on liquidity. In summary, our 
test supports Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. 
5.3 The effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
The above analysis leads us to the conclusion that institutions have a positive impact on liquidity 
as a homogenous group. After classification, we find that whereas transient institutions and quasi-
indexed institutions have a positive influence on liquidity, dedicated institutions decrease 
liquidity. These results are consistent with previous studies. In this section, we continue to seek 
whether an external disclosure policy, Reg FD, will affect the relationship. 
From another perspective, Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2004) examine the impact 
of Reg FD on trading costs and information asymmetry after Reg FD. Chiyachantana, Jiang, 
Taechapiroontong and Wood (2004) fmd that market liquidity has improved during the pre-
announcement period post-FD in the form oflower spreads, higher depth and lower adverse 
selection cost component. Topaloglu (2003) reports less informed trading by examining 
institutional trading activities around Reg FD. Our test also intends to address this problem this 
issue of - Are the changes in trading costs related to changes in institutional investors? 
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Due to the unbalanced nature of the data, we run difference-in-indifference regressions with fixed 
industry and time effects. Our variable of interest is the interaction term in Eq. (3), i.e. a3. In the 
first panel of Table 6, we see no significant coefficient of F Dit * Zit except for the case of 
amh_ma, as t-statistics of the interaction terms are -1.300,1.485, -0.796 and 1.735 when liquidity 
is measured by amh, amh_sq, roll and tnov. We do not find reliable support for Hypothesis 6. We 
do detect some evidence of an overall decrease in trading cost after Reg FD, as the sum of al and 
a3 is negative. But in general, the effectiveness of Reg FD in ameliorating the information 
advantage of institutions is not found. 
Previous studies do show a change in institutional behaviour around Reg FD. And our fITst part of 
this study proves different impacts from classified institutions. Therefore, we run further tests to 
see whether the effectiveness of Reg FD is limited to specific institutions only. The next tlrree 
panels of Table 6 show the results of the tlrree types of institutions respectively. When Z 
represents transient institutional ownership, we discover that coefficients of interactions between 
FD and TRA yet are negative for all trading cost measures and the coefficients are significant in 
the cases of amh, amh _ ma and amh _sq. The results indicate that Reg FD reduces the information 
advantage of transient institutions, as suggested in previous studies (e.g. Ke and Petroni, 2004). 
On the other hand, we can say that firms with high transient institutional holdings are subject to 
selective disclosure before Reg FD (Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie's, 2010) and Reg FD improves the 
fairness between transient institutions and the public. This result is consistent with Ke, Petroni 
and Yu's (2008) research, which finds transient institutions no longer possess the ability to 
predict a bad news break after Reg FD. We fmd support for Hypothesis 6. 
In the case of quasi-indexers, we find that there is still a negative association with trading costs 
measures. There is not much evidence for frrms with higher quasi-indexed ownership to support 
the argument that higher liquidity after Reg FD. For example, when liquidity is measured using 
roll, the t-statistics is -0.921 and -0.829 for FD XQIX yet. This can partly be explained by 
independence of private information in trades by this group of institutions, as mentioned in the 
first part of the study. For dedicated institutions, we find positively significant coefficients of 
interaction terms using amh, amh_ma and amh_sq. Straser (2002) contend that quality of 
disclosure is lower after the passing of Reg FD and information asymmetry is more severe. Sidhu, 
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Smith, Shaley and Sillis (2008) suggest an increase in adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread in the post-FD period. These results can be explained by the "chilling effect" and multi-
relationship between dedicated institutions and firms. Our fmdings suggest Reg FD is ineffective 
in limiting selective disclosure to dedicated institutions and the "chilling effect" of Reg FD is 
more obvious for firms with higher dedicated institutions. Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 are 
supported to the extent that the incentive of Reg FD to mitigate information asymmetry between 
institutional traders and the public is not realized for quasi-indexed and dedicated institutional 
institutions. 
5.4 American Depositary Receipts and foreign firms 
One of the most complicated issues in studying Reg FD is the compounding effect, as Reg FD 
was implemented to target all US public companies at the same time (October 23, 2000) by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Some of the changes might be caused by factors 
other than Reg FD. For example, reduced liquidity might be due to other factors. For example, 
some FD studies imposed controls for confounding events by including industry or 
macroeconomic variables (Heflin et aI., 2003). Bailey et ai. (2003) find an alternative explanation 
for changes observed pre- and post- FD, stating that market behavior around earnings releases 
displays no significant change in return volatility after controlling for decimalization of stock 
trading. Also, the economic recession may have influenced the effects. There are also cross 
sectional studies on the degree to which firms are affected by Reg FD. Prior studies show that 
Reg FD had a more pronounced effect on smaller firms (Gomes et aI., 2004; Bailey et aI., 2003), 
and size has been associated in prior research with the characteristics of firms' information 
environment (e.g., EI-Gazzar, 1998; Bamber, 1987; Lang &Lundholm, 1996). Bushee et ai. 
(2004) analyze relative effects of Reg FD on fmns that had previously held open versus closed 
conference calls; Gintschel and Markev's (2004) investigation of variation in pre-versus post-
differences in price responses to analyst reports based on brokerage and stock characteristics; and 
Mohanram and Sumder's (2001) analysis of Reg FD effects on the forecasting ability of all-star 
versus non-aU-star analysts. AU these studies aUow for a stronger experimental design (using 
"control" group design with pre and post-tests). 
Many events occurred in United States around Reg FD period. To rule out the confounding 
effects, we need one control group of companies that are not affected by Reg FD. Francis, Nanda 
and Wang (2006) use foreign firms listed on US exchanges with American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) as a control group, as both US firms and ADRs are subject to other events that affect all 
fmns traded in the US, but ADRs are exempt from Reg FD. With regard to analyst information 
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effects, they find no difference between US and ADR firms pre- and post- FD in terms of analyst 
forecast accuracy or dispersion, return volatility, trading volume and informational efficiency. 
However, they report declined informativeness for US firms relative to ADRs. Using ADRs as 
the control group, we can examine the effects of broad information dissemination brought by Reg 
FD without the confounding effects. 
ADRs are identified in CRSP by variable share code (SHRCD=30, 31 or 12). We identify 7,846 
observations of ADR, approximately 178x44 firm-quarter data. Table 7 presents the results using 
this sample and the same regression equation as that of Table 6. In contrast with U.S. firm data, 
the coefficients of the interaction between TRA yct and FD are no longer significant for all 
trading cost measures. For QIJ(pct and DED yct, the coefficients on interaction terms are also as 
significant as those using U.S. firms in the sample. This indicates that the impact of Reg FD on 
ADRs are much smaller, compared to U.S. firms, which is consistent with the fact that ADRs are 
exempt from Reg FD. The results here show that ADRs can be used as control group for Reg FD 
studies, contrary to Francis et al,'s (2006) study. Similarly, Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie (2010) also 
support the validity of using ADRs as the control group to study Reg FD, as they show that cost 
of capital does decrease for U.S. firms in the post-FD periods, but does not for ADRs on average. 
In this way, we confrrm that liquidity change through institutions in Section 5.3 is caused by Reg 
FD instead of other factors. 
5.5 Summary of results 
All our results are summarized in the following table. 
Hypothesis Results and Implications 
Hl(a): Institutional ownership is The results in Table 2 and Table 3 support Hl(a) instead of 
associated with higher liquidity Hl(b). 
Hl(b): Institutional ownership is The impact of aggregated institutional ownership on 
associated with lower liquidity liquidity is positive. 
Institutions have information efficiency (Mendelson and 
Tunca, 2004) and adverse selection effects (Easley and 
O'Hara) and the former is the dominant one. 
H2: Transient institutional Table 4 and Table 5 support this hypothesis. 
ownership is associated with 
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higher liquidity Subrahmanyam's (1991) model states traders who possess 
correlated precise information and compete intensely have 
positive impact on liquidity The results show evidence on 
this. 
H3: Dedicated institutional Table 4 and Table 5 support this hypothesis. 
ownership is associated with 
Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model demonstrates how 
lower liquidity 
information advantage of insiders leads to positive bid-ask 
spread. The results show that dedicated institutions act as 
insiders. 
H4: Quasi-indexed institutional Table 4 and Table 5 support this hypothesis. 
ownership is associated with 
Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) model assumes that there 
higher liquidity 
are a group of discretionary liquidity traders who can 
determine the timing of trading. The assumption insures the 
existence of equilibrium of minimize trading cost. Our 
results show these traders boost liquidity. 
H5: The improvement of The first panel of Table 6 shows few supports for the 
liquidity is greater for firms with hypothesis. 
higher institutional ownership 
The overall impact of Reg FD on liquidity through 
afterRegFD 
mitigating information advantage of institutional investors 
is insignificant. 
H6: The improvement of The second panel of Table 6 supports this hypothesis. 
liquidity is greater for firms with 
By preventing transient institutional investors from 
higher transient institutional 
obtaining information in selective disclosure, Reg FD 
holdings 
improves the liquidity of the firm stock. 
The results are consistent with works by Chen, Dhaliwal & 
Xie (2010 and Ke, Petroni and Yu (2008). 
H7: The improvement of The third panel of Table 6 supports this hypothesis. 
liquidity is not significant for 
The "chilling effect" of Reg FD has increased the 
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firms with higher dedicated information privilege of insider and has resulted in even 
institutional holdings more serious information asymmetry. 
Our results are consistent with works by Straser (2002) 
H8: The improvement of The fourth panel of Table 6 supports this hypothesis. 
liquidity is not significant for 
Quasi-indexers use passive strategy and do not rely on 
firms with higher ownership of 
private information a lot. Reg FD has no clear impact on 
quasi-indexers 
this group of institutions. 
VI. Conclusion 
Whether institutions have a positive or negative impact on stock liquidity? Whether Reg FD is 
effective in reducing the information advantage of institutions? The extant studies on these two 
topics are inconclusive. We empirically test two opposite effects hypothesized in the previous 
literature by examining the effect of institutional ownership on liquidity, using both annual and 
quarterly sample from 1995 to 2005 and a number of trading costs and liquidity measures. We 
find strong evidence of a positive impact of institutional ownership on liquidity. After classifying 
institutions according to Bushee's (1998) scheme, we find that transient institutions have a 
positive impact on liquidity due to intense competition. This lends support to the theoretical work 
by Subrahmanyam (1991), Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) Foster and Viswanathan (1996) 
and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000). We fmd that quasi-indexer improves liquidity due to 
uninformative and high frequency trading. In contrast, dedicated institutions create information 
asymmetry and inventory risk, thus lowering liquidity. Bushee's classification is applied in our 
study of Reg FD, too. Whereas, Reg FD is not effective in improving liquidity through reducing 
information asymmetry for institutions as a whole group, Reg FD does prevent transient 
institutions trading on material information ahead of the public. This phenomenon does not exist 
for the other two groups of institutional investors. We control for confounding effects by carrying 
out the same regressions on American Depositary Receipts. Our regression results suggest that 
Reg FD had unintended consequences and that "information" from firms to institutions may be 
more complicated than current studies find. Overall, Reg FD is effective but the effectiveness is 
only limited to a certain group of institutions. 
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Graph 1 - Trend Graph of Institutional Share 
The following graph shows the percentage of stock share held by institutions dnring 1990-2009. The percentage of 
stock share held by institutions is calculated as dividing institution-owned shares (from Spectrum Database) by total 
shares outstanding (from CRSP). 
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Table I - Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of annua11iquidity measures, annual institutional ownership measures and other annual control variable. Panel A is the descriptive statistics 
of annual data. Panel B is the correlation matrix of annual data. Panel C is the descriptive statistics of quarterly data. Panel D is the correlation matrix of quarterly data. We present 
summary statistics by pooling observations over the entire sample period of 1995-2005 for the following measures: amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over year of 
1000000 X abs(return)/(abs(price) X volume); amh _ ma, market adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over year of 1000000 X abs(retum)/( abs(price) X volume) over 
market average Amihud illiquidity measure; amh _sq, square root variant Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over year of 1000 X sqrt( abs(return)1 abs(price) X volume); 
c _ BMA, Gibbs estimate of trading cost from Basic Market-Adjusted model; crnz, Moment estimate of trading cost, based on all reported prices, including quoted midpoints; 
crnzAlt, Moment estimate of trading cost, excluding quote midpoints; tnov, turnover over the year, average trading volume over the year shares outstanding; roll, the quarterly 
version of cmz; INS yct, amount of shares held by institutions that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares 
outstanding; TRA yct, amount of shares held by transient institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 
13F filings divided by shares outstanding; QIJ(pct, amount of shares held by quasi-indexed institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long 
positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; DEDyct, amount of shares held by dedicated institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that 
have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; ret, return of the year; retlag, return of last year; prcln, log of the 
price at the end ofthe year; size, the total market capitalization of the firm calculated at the end of the year (shares outstandingxprice);prcsq, square of price at the end of the year; 
volume, sum of the daily trading volume over the year; volatility, variance of daily return over the year; numtrd, sum of the daily trading number over the year 
Panel A: Descrietiye Statistics !Annuall 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum 1st Pctl 99th Pctl Maximum Std Dey 
amh 51492.00 3.51 0.10 0.00 0.00 58.52 3514.19 25.90 
amh_ma 51492.00 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.00 8.53 223.95 3.08 
amh_sq 51492.00 0.61 0.25 0.00 0.01 4.85 32.44 1.03 
c_BMA 51492.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.01 
cmz 51492.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.35 0.01 
cmzAlt 51492.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.31 0.01 
tnoy 51492.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.64 0.01 
INS_pet 51492.00 0.37 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.95 1.00 0.28 
TRA_pet 51492.00 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.96 0.12 
DED_pct 51492.00 
QIX_pet 51492.00 
ret 51492.00 
retlag 51492.00 
prcln 51492.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.20 
0.21 
2.43 
0.07 
0.15 
0.07 
0.08 
2.64 
size 51492.00 
prcsq 51492.00 
volume 51492.00 
volatility 51492.00 
numtrd 51492.00 
2097186.44 
994308.47 
90637711.66 
0.00 
118006.49 
164228.75 
196.28 
13430659.00 
0.00 
9543.00 
Panel B: Correlation (Annual) 
amh amh_ amh_s c_BMA cmz 
rna q 
amh 1.00 0.74 0.69 0.52 0.45 
amh_ 0.74 1.00 0.63 0.46 0.40 
rna 
amh_ 0.69 0.63 1.00 0.83 0.72 
sq 
c_B 0.52 0.46 0.83 1.00 0.89 
MA 
cmz 0.45 0.40 0.72 0.89 1.00 
cmz 0.46 0.41 0.74 0.90 0.98 
Alt 
tnov -0.06 -0.07 -0.19 -0.12 -0.12 
ins_p -0.14 -0.16 -0.45 -0.46 -0.41 
ct 
tra_p -0.07 -0.10 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 
ct 
ded -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
pet -
qix_p -0.11 -0.12 -0.38 -0.42 -0.35 
ct 
retyr -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
retIa -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 
gyr 
preln -0.26 -0.27 -0.56 -0.60 -0.58 
size -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 
cmzAlt 
0.46 
0.41 
0.74 
0.90 
0.98 
1.00 
-0.12 
-0.41 
-0.24 
-0.08 
-0.35 
-0.09 
-0.13 
-0.56 
-0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
-1.00 
-0.99 
-4.16 
43.89 
0.00 
24200.00 
0.00 
3.00 
tnov 
-0.06 
-0.07 
-0.19 
-0.12 
-0.12 
-0.12 
1.00 
0.18 
0.24 
-0.01 
0.09 
0.11 
0.23 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.89 
-0.83 
-1.05 
2798.25 
0.12 
148552.00 
0.00 
218.00 
0.46 
0.75 
3.46 
3.59 
4.51 
36081439.60 
8190.25 
1266421165.00 
0.02 
1973155.00 
ins_pc tra_p ded_p qix_pet 
t ct et 
-0.14 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 
-0.16 -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 
-0.45 -0.28 -0.08 -0.38 
-0.46 -0.26 -0.07 -0.42 
-0.41 -0.24 -0.08 -0.35 
-0.41 -0.24 -0.08 -0.35 
0.18 0.24 -0.01 0.09 
1.00 0.67 0.42 0.81 
0.67 1.00 -0.01 0.25 
0.42 -0.01 1.00 0.00 
0.81 0.25 0.00 1.00 
0.04 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 
0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.06 
0.52 0.29 0.11 0.46 
0.13 0.03 -0.03 0.16 
retyr 
-0.03 
-0.03 
-0.05 
-0.08 
-0.09 
-0.09 
0.11 
0.04 
0.11 
-0.03 
-0.02 
1.00 
-0.07 
0.26 
0.01 
0.92 
0.97 
32.00 
32.00 
11.39 
602432918.75 
7853504400.00 
21295701488.00 
0.67 
24006324.00 
retlagyr 
-0.05 
-0.05 
-0.14 
-0.13 
-0.13 
-0.13 
0.23 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.01 
0.06 
-0.07 
1.00 
0.14 
0.01 
prcln 
-0.26 
-0.27 
-0.56 
-0.60 
-0.58 
-0.56 
0.06 
0.52 
0.29 
0.11 
0.46 
0.26 
0.14 
1.00 
0.20 
0.11 
0.18 
0.91 
0.91 
1.20 
44 
12379264.74 
76152555.82 
426736868.81 
0.01 
662206.17 
size 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.10 
-0.11 
-0.09 
-0.09 
0.01 
0.13 
0.03 
-0.03 
0.16 
0.01 
0.01 
0.20 
1.00 
prcsq vol volatility numtrd 
0.00 -0.03 0.38 -0.03 
0.00 -0.03 0.29 -0.04 
-0.01 -0.11 0.37 -0.11 
-0.01 -0.10 0.44 -0.11 
-0.01 -0.09 0.51 -0.10 
-0.01 -0.09 0.47 -0.10 
-0.01 0.18 0.11 0.24 
-0.01 0.16 -0.19 0.19 
-0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.11 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 
-0.01 0.16 -0.18 0.21 
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.07 
0.10 0.11 -0.37 0.12 
0.10 0.57 -0.04 0.65 
prcs 0.00 
q 
vol -0.03 
volati 0.38 
lity 
numt -0.03 
rd 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.29 
-0.04 
-0.01 
-0.11 
0.37 
-0.11 
-0.01 
-0.10 
0.44 
-0.11 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics (Quarterly) 
Variable 
amh 
amh_ma 
amh_sq 
roll 
tnov 
INS_pct 
TRA_pet 
DED_pct 
QIX_pct 
ret 
retlag 
prcln 
size 
prcsq 
vol 
volatility 
numtrd 
N 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
208229.00 
Mean 
4.31 
0.64 
0.62 
0.14 
0.01 
0.35 
0.11 
0.10 
0.19 
0.04 
0.04 
2.51 
1884683.64 
912044.42 
20609092.62 
0.00 
26540.01 
Panel D: Correlation (Quarterly) 
amh 
amh_ma 
amh amh_ma amh_sq 
1.00 
0.90 
0.90 
1.00 
0.64 
0.57 
-0.01 
-0.09 
0.51 
-0.10 
-0.01 
-0.09 
0.47 
-0.10 
Median 
0.07 
0.01 
0.22 
0.06 
0.00 
0.29 
0.07 
0.07 
0.14 
0.02 
0.02 
2.68 
163814.50 
213.89 
2697463.50 
0.00 
1883.00 
-0.01 
0.18 
0.11 
0.24 
Minimum 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.99 
-0.96 
-4.16 
4.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.16 
-0.19 
0.19 
-0.01 
0.09 
-0.07 
0.11 
1st Pctl 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.63 
-0.60 
-0.78 
3020.00 
0.21 
22300.00 
0.00 
33.00 
-0.01 
-0.03 
-0.10 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.16 
-0.18 
0.21 
99th Petl 
68.73 
10.88 
5.63 
0.85 
0.04 
0.95 
0.53 
0.47 
0.75 
1.12 
1.10 
4.54 
32238981.54 
8732.90 
295663373.00 
0.02 
463739.00 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
Maximum 
17186.53 
2687.06 
108.27 
504.63 
2.45 
1.00 
1.00 
0.97 
1.00 
14.00 
14.00 
11.44 
0.00 
0.03 
-0.04 
0.07 
602432918.75 
8704890000.00 
9482005062.00 
2.76 
6801721.00 
0.10 
0.11 
-0.37 
0.12 
Std Dev 
63.83 
8.24 
1.29 
2.51 
0.02 
0.28 
0.12 
0.11 
0.18 
0.32 
0.32 
1.13 
10993337.95 
70914149.38 
109862281.95 
0.01 
156184.09 
roll tnov ins_pet tra_pct ded_pct qix_pct retyq retlagyq preln size prcsq 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.06 
-0.07 
-0.04 -0.02 
-0.06 -0.03 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
-0.16 -0.01 
-0.15 -0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.57 
-0.04 
0.65 
vol 
-0.01 
-0.01 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
1.00 
-0.01 
0.91 
volatility numtrd 
0.18 
0.15 
-0.01 
-0.01 
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0.00 
-0.01 
1.00 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.91 
-0.02 
1.00 
amh_sq 
roll 
tnov 
ins_pct 
tra_pct 
ded_pct 
qix_pct 
retyq 
retlagyq 
prcln 
size 
prcsq 
vol 
volatility 
numtrd 
0.64 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.16 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.18 
-0.01 
0.57 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.07 
-0.06 
-0.03 
-0.05 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.15 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.15 
-0.01 
1.00 
-0.01 
-0.10 
-0.34 
-0.21 
-0.07 
-0.29 
-0.06 
-0.10 
-0.52 
-0.08 
-0.01 
-0.08 
0.26 
-0.09 
-0.01 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.08 
0.07 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
-0.10 
0.00 
1.00 
0.10 
0.15 
-0.01 
0.04 
0.08 
0.08 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.07 
0.17 
-0.34 
0.00 
0.10 
1.00 
0.67 
0.44 
0.81 
0.02 
0.04 
0.48 
0.13 
-0.01 
0.15 
-0.10 
0.20 
-0.21 
0.00 
0.15 
0.67 
1.00 
0.02 
0.26 
0.05 
0.05 
0.27 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.09 
-0.05 
0.13 
-0.07 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.44 
0.02 
1.00 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.13 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.03 
-0.29 
0.00 
0.04 
0.81 
0.26 
0.02 
1.00 
-0.01 
0.01 
0.43 
0.16 
0.00 
0.14 
-0.09 
0.20 
-0.06 
0.00 
0.08 
0.02 
0.05 
-0.01 
-0.01 
1.00 
-0.01 
0.19 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
-0.10 
0.01 
0.08 
0.04 
0.05 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.01 
1.00 
0.16 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.06 
0.02 
-0.52 -0.08 -0.01 
0.08 0.07 0.53 
0.06 0.00 0.00 
0.48 0.13 -0.01 
0.27 0.04 -0.01 
0.13 -0.02 -0.01 
0.43 0.16 0.00 
0.19 0.01 0.00 
0.16 0.01 0.00 
1.00 0.20 0.10 
0.20 1.00 0.11 
0.10 0.11 1.00 
0.09 0.50 0.00 
-0.24 -0.02 0.00 
0.13 0.62 0.11 
-0.08 
0.00 
0.15 
0.15 
0.09 
-0.02 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.50 
0.00 
1.00 
0.01 
0.85 
0.26 
0.00 
0.07 
-0.10 
-0.05 
-0.05 
-0.09 
0.03 
-0.06 
-0.24 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
1.00 
-0.01 
-0.09 
0.08 
0.17 
0.20 
0.13 
-0.03 
0.20 
0.01 
0.02 
0.13 
0.62 
0.11 
0.85 
-0.01 
1.00 
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Table 2 - Effect ofInstitutional Ownership on Liquidity (Annual) 
This table presents regression results of institution ownership on liquidity using annual measures. We present both 
coefficients and t-statistics. Annual liquidity measures are as follows: amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average 
over year of 1000000 X abs(return)/(abs(price) X volume); amh _ ma, market adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. 
average over year of 1000000 X abs(return)/( abs(price) X volume) over market average Amihud illiquidity measure; 
amh _sq, square root variant Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over year of 1000 X sqrt( abs(return)/ 
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abs(price) X volume); c_BMA, Gibbs estimate ofc from Basic Market-Adjusted model; crnz, Moment estimate ofc, 
based on all reported prices, including quoted midpoints; cmzAlt, Moment estimate of c, excluding quote midpoints; 
tnov, turnover over the year, average trading volume over the year shares outstanding; institutional ownership measures 
include INSyct, amount of shares held by institutions that have reported that they held long positions in the security of 
interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding. Control variables are: ret, return of the year; retlag, return oflast 
year; prcln, log of the price at the end of the year; size, the total market capitalization of the firm calculated at the end 
of the year (shares outstandingxprice);prcsq, square of price at the end of the year; volume, sum of the daily trading 
volume over the year; volatility, variance of daily return over the year; numtrd, sum of the daily trading number over 
the year. Panel A displays pooled regression results; Panel B shows pooled regression after controlling for industry 
effect (following Kenneth French's 12-industry classification scheme); Panel C presents regression results with 
industry and year fixed effect. 
Liqit = 0i + Ot + (JINS + Ylretit + YzretlaOit + Y3prclnit + Y4sizeit 
+ Ysprcsq + Y6volumeit + Y7volatilitYit + Ysnumtrd + tit 
Panel A: Pooled Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq c_BMA cmz cmzAlt tnov 
intercept 4.7894 1.1336 1.6850 0.0249 0.0240 0.0252 0.0027 
(1.816) (7.056) (2.922) (2.193) (6.681) (7.462) (5.728) 
ins_pet -3.2850 -0.8053 -1.0310 -0.0120 -0.0102 -0.0121 0.0104 
(-4.683) (-1.107) (-3.460) (-2.494) (-5.885) (-7.986) (4.905) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(2.604) (3.134) (5.428) (2.235) (3.844) (3.908) (3.936) 
prcln -1.8230 -0.2846 -0.3127 -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0005 
(-0.336) (-5.609) (-2.424) (-6.086) (-8.783) (-2.485) (-6.400) 
prcsq 2.2179 0.2907 0.2387 0.0032 0.0037 0.0037 0.0015 
(1.288) (1.633) (4.098) (4.586) (5.335) (4.761) (2.111) 
ret -0.2346 -0.0240 0.0365 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0015 
(-1.483) (-1.466) (6.823) (2.520) (-2.935) (-3.735) (2.972) 
retlag -0.6519 -0.0526 -0.0742 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0026 
(-4.311) (-3.363) (-4.516) (-3.070) (-6.945) (-6.388) (0.352) 
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size 866.4372 93.3257 66.0603 0.6576 0.8734 0.8976 -2.1783 
(3.254) (3.391) (7.337) (6.118) (8.135) (7.454) (-9.237) 
volatility 1818.3475 141.9772 37.8480 0.6364 0.8472 0.8680 0.2873 
(4.822) (8.963) (9.895) (6.185) (4.890) (8.418) (4.078) 
volume -35.0159 -4.0789 -2.8320 -0.0220 -0.0287 -0.0311 -0.0116 
(-4.103) (-4.623) (-9.812) (-6.381) (-8.332) (-8.051) (-3.196) 
Panel B: Pooled Regression with Industry Controls 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq cmz cmzAlt tnov 
intercept 5.4389 1.2188 1.7709 0.0250 0.0264 0.0018 
(9.265) (0.119) (0.804) (6.625) (0.491) (7.293) 
insJ)et 0.5714 -0.3645 -0.8030 -0.0083 -0.0096 0.0068 
(0.730) (-4.513) (-0.882) (-6.456) (-7.378) (0.574) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(3.227) (3.858) (6.815) (4.840) (4.967) (2.857) 
prcln -2.7470 -0.3915 -0.3700 -0.0046 -0.0048 0.0005 
(-3.801) (-9.060) (-5.954) (-8.348) (-3.825) (5.502) 
prcsq 2.7887 0.3538 0.2666 0.0039 0.0040 0.0010 
(1.626) (1.999) (4.678) (5.657) (5.156) (1.423) 
ret 0.0980 0.0172 0.0604 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0012 
(0.613) (1.044) (1.354) (0.346) (-0.088) (8.074) 
retlag -0.4453 -0.0265 -0.0585 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0024 
(-2.945) (-1.699) (-1.635) (-4.647) (-3.926) (7.762) 
size 827.9125 88.2800 63.0176 0.8339 0.8582 -2.1608 
(3.126) (3.230) (7.161) (7.882) (7.239) (-9.400) 
volatility 1842.6326 144.7299 39.4695 0.8638 0.8867 0.2704 
(5.925) (0.175) (2.503) (7.365) (0.881) (3.005) 
volume -32.8793 -3.8314 -2.6860 -0.0267 -0.0290 -0.0125 
(-3.867) (-4.367) (-9.509) (-7.874) (-7.625) (-3.507) 
Panel C: Fixed·Effect Regresssion 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq c_BMA cmz cmzAlt tnov 
intercept 6.4450 2.1808 1.6711 0.0205 0.0212 0.0223 0.0014 
(7.845) (5.901) (1.541) (6.281) (6.332) (2.152) (3.917) 
ins_pet 0.1906 -0.5818 -0.8029 -0.0076 -0.0063 -0.0074 0.0075 
(0.239) (-7.118) (-0.458) (-5.299) (-0.263) (-1.280) (2.295) 
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numtrd 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(2.759) (-0.096) (7.846) (2.923) (1.128) (1.112) (4.068) 
prcln -2.7565 -0.3774 -0.3681 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0052 0.0003 
(-3.644) (-8.227) (-5.123) (-4.079) (-3.271) (-8.646) (4.068) 
prcsq 2.9681 0.3459 0.2702 0.0038 0.0042 0.0043 0.0011 
(1.736) (1.974) (4.780) (5.930) (6.276) (5.768) (1.520) 
ret -0.0030 0.0227 0.0570 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0013 
(-0.018) (1.354) (0.533) (8.225) (2.989) (2.388) (8.567) 
retlag -0.2738 -0.0711 -0.0467 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0024 
(-1.753) (-4.443) (-9.049) (-9.281) (-4.252) (-3.287) (6.793) 
size 916.8604 102.8235 65.9500 0.4712 0.7395 0.7580 -2.2281 
(3.470) (3.797) (7.551) (4.731) (7.185) (6.568) (-0.073) 
volatility 1866.0879 149.4845 39.6369 0.6091 0.8353 0.8559 0.2536 
(6.561) (2.024) (2.773) (7.644) (6.487) (9.907) (1.537) 
volume -30.8525 -1.2523 -2.9872 -0.0411 -0.0407 -0.0443 -0.0159 
(-3.601) (-1.426) (-0.548) (-2.719) (-2.195) (-1.849) (-4.420) 
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Table 3 - Effect ofInstitutional Ownership on Liquidity (Quarterly) 
This table presents regression results of institution ownership on liquidity using quarterly measures. We present both 
coefficients and t-statistics. Quarterly liquidity measures are as follows: amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average 
over year of 1000000 X abs(return)/(abs(price) X volume); amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over quarter of 
1000000 X abs(return)/(abs(price) X volume); amh _ ma, market adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over 
quarter ofl 000000 X abs(return)/( abs(price) X volume) over market average Amihud illiquidity measure; amh _sq, 
square root variant Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over quarter ofl 000 X sqrt(abs(return)/ 
abs(price) X volume); roll, Moment estimate of c, based on all reported prices, including quoted midpoints; tnov, 
turnover over the quarter, average trading volume over the quarter shares outstanding; institutional ownership measures 
include INS yct, amount of shares held by institutions that have reported that they held long positions in the security of 
interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding. Control variables are: ret, return of the quarter; retlag, return of 
last quarter; prcln, log of the price at the end of the quarter; size, the total market capitalization of the firm calculated at 
the end of the quarter (shares outstandingxprice);prcsq, square of price at the end ofthe quarter; volume, sum of the 
daily trading volume over the quarter; volatility, variance of daily return over the quarter; numtrd, sum of the daily 
trading number over the quarter. Panel A displays pooled regression results; Panel B shows pooled regression after 
controlling for industry effect (following Kenneth French's 12-industry classification scheme); Panel C presents 
regression results with industry and year fixed effect; Panel D is the results of Fama-Macbeth regressions. 
Liqit = 0i + Ot + fJINS + Ylretit + Yzretlagit + Y3prclnit + Y4sizeit 
+ Ysprcsq + Y6volumeit + Y7volatilitYit + YBnumtrd + tit 
Panel A: Pooled Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 21.6453 2.9040 2.1846 0.0604 -0.0013 
(5.558) (6.508) (4.076) (8.250) (-0.377) 
ins_pet 1.0188 -0.2877 -0.8653 -0.1130 0.0089 
(O.908) (-1.981) (-9.032) (-9.899) (2.106) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(3.051) (2.870) (9.188) (1.925) (2.308) 
prcln -8.3428 -1.0164 -0.5382 0.0668 -0.0003 
(-9.581) (-7.860) (-1.379) (3.819) (-6.853) 
presq 96.1933 10.9781 4.6589 2.7732 0.0316 
(7.739) (6.828) (3.842) (8.408) (6.602) 
ret -1.0928 -0.0630 0.0380 -0.0522 0.0044 
(-1.608) (-0.717) (3.555) (-OA24) (2.334) 
retlagyq 0.0849 0.0086 -0.0867 0.0056 0.0042 
(O.126) (O.099) (-8.156) (3.269) (OA96) 
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size 1451.9200 167.7101 76.2856 -2.0389 -3.4508 
(3.116) (2.783) (0.414) (-1.734) (-8.425) 
volatility 1263.0809 124.9212 22.3589 1.5205 0.1577 
(2.417) (0.077) (9.019) (5.003) (2.804) 
volume -244.7529 -29.4820 -14.0225 -0.8072 0.2232 
(-4.468) (-4.161) (-6.283) (-5.840) (6.643) 
Panel B: Pooled Regression with Industry Controls 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 25.0993 3.3009 2.2542 0.0617 -0.0017 
(3.531) (3.924) (6.131) (2.900) (-0.433) 
ins_pet 6.4404 0.4000 -0.6061 -0.1144 0.0057 
(5.249) (2.521) (-1.823) (-6.927) (0.817) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(3.545) (3.396) (1.293) (1.978) (0.161) 
prcln -9.7436 -1.1932 -0.6074 0.0670 0.0006 
(-1.147) (-9.489) (-5.083) (4.829) (2.148) 
presq 106.5380 12.1668 5.1353 2.7636 0.0256 
(8.552) (7.551) (6.554) (7.847) (3.631) 
ret -0.1786 0.0571 0.0868 -0.0520 0.0039 
(-0.261) (0.646) (8.184) (-0.142) (7.319) 
retlagyq 0.8562 0.1107 -0.0446 0.0057 0.0037 
(1.262) (1.262) (-4.233) (3.340) (6.343) 
size 1403.2629 160.4744 73.4878 -1.9634 -3.4232 
(3.014) (2.664) (0.167) (-1.670) (-8.692) 
volatility 1267.7577 125.5467 22.6997 1.5147 0.1547 
(2.619) (0.285) (0.690) (4.894) (2.529) 
volume -232.7686 -27.8882 -13.4476 -0.8255 0.2184 
(-4.246) (-3.933) (-5.800) (-5.962) (6.384) 
Panel C: Fixed-Effect Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 25.3528 4.4361 2.0956 -0.0234 -0.0022 
(1.317) (5.314) (0.572) (-4.178) (-6.516) 
ins_pct 7.2266 0.3478 -0.5824 -0.0919 0.0062 
(5.739) (2.136) (-9.951) (-9.176) (2.718) 
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numlrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(3.995) (1.968) (3.988) (8.541) (0.472) 
preln -9.9488 -1.2366 -0.6047 0.0642 0.0004 
(-1.079) (-9.875) (-2.314) (0.142) (8.893) 
presq 111.3115 12.7767 5.2300 2.7246 0.0243 
(8.922) (7.920) (7.144) (7.291) (2.941) 
ret -0.7876 -0.0325 0.0749 -0.0427 0.0041 
(-1.093) (-0.349) (6.728) (-3.672) (7.390) 
retlagyq 1.4947 0.0423 -0.0226 0.0098 0.0038 
(2.084) (0.456) (-2.037) (5.440) (5.644) 
size 1375.5522 167.9475 71.8079 -3.3384 -3.4466 
(2.954) (2.789) (9.984) (-2.865) (-9.146) 
volatility 1274.5606 127.1671 22.7924 1.3009 0.1494 
(2.705) (0.668) (1.029) (1.502) (1.019) 
volume -244.8967 -20.3585 -15.0346 -1.4320 0.2164 
(-4.436) (-2.852) (-7.635) (-0.368) (6.032) 
Table 4 - Effect of Classified Institutional Ownership on Liquidity (Annual) 
This table presents regression results of institution ownership on liquidity using annual measures. We present both 
coefficients and t-statistics. Annual liquidity measures are as follows: amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average 
over year of 1000000 X abs(return)/( abs(price) X volume); amh _ ma, market adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. 
average over year of 1000000 X abs(return)/(abs(price) X volume) over market average Amihud illiquidity measure; 
amh _sq, square root variant Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over year of 1000 X sqrt( abs(return)/ 
53 
abs(price) X volume); c _ BMA, Gibbs estimate of c from Basic Market-Adjusted model; cmz, Moment estimate of c, 
based on all reported prices, including quoted midpoints; cmzAlt, Moment estimate of c, excluding quote midpoints; 
tnov, turnover over the year, average trading volume over the year shares outstanding; institutional ownership measures 
include TRAyct, amount of shares held by transient institutions (defmed by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported 
that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; QIX yct, amount of 
shares held by quasi-indexed institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long 
positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; DED yct, amount of shares held by 
dedicated institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long positions in the security 
of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding. Control variables are: ret, return of the year; retlag, return of 
last year; prcln, log of the price at the end of the year; size, the total market capitalization of the firm calculated at the 
end of the year (shares outstandingxprice);prcsq, square of price at the end of the year; volume, sum of the daily 
trading volume over the year; volatility, variance of daily return over the year; numtrd, sum of the daily trading number 
over the year. Panel A displays pooled regression results; Panel B shows pooled regression after controlling for 
industry effect (following Kenneth French's 12-industry classification scheme); Panel C presents regression results 
with industry and year fixed effect; Panel D is the results ofFama-Macbeth regressions. 
Liqit = 0i + Ot + B1TRA_pCtit + B2QIX_pctit + B3DED-pctit + Ylretit 
+ Y2retlagit + Y3prclnit + Y4sizeit + Ysprcsq + Y6volumeit 
+ Y7volatilitYit + Y8numtrd + tit 
Panel A Pooled Regression 
Panel A: Pooled Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq c_BMA cmz cmzAlt tnov 
intercept 4.0583 0.4987 1.1389 0.0177 0.0173 0.0177 -0.0009 
(7.527) (O.621) (7.971) (4.442) (6.982) (4.992) (-3.185) 
TRA_pct -3.4171 -0.5106 -0.8299 -0.0120 -0.0133 -0.0143 0.0222 
(-0.631) (-9.684) (-6.059) (-6.336) (-3.634) (-4.116) (6.991) 
QIX_pct -1.5550 -0.2268 -0.7275 -0.0104 -0.0070 -0.0077 0.0037 
(-4.993) (-4.440) (-3.580) (-3.432) (-2.730) (-3.436) (6.425) 
OED_pet 0.2870 -0.0546 -0.0854 0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0061 
(O.717) (-0.832) (-2.153) (4.613) (-0.414) (-0.776) (8.141) 
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numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(3.497) (2.301) (4.051) (1.960) (1.906) (1.979) (5.291) 
prcln -1.1072 -0.1164 -0.1945 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0007 
(-0.332) (-3.032) (-6.051) (-0.716) (-5.451) (-3.788) (6.736) 
presq 1.6477 0.1681 0.2158 0.0032 0.0039 0.0038 0.0016 
(2.995) (1.862) (3.960) (4.104) (4.006) (3.739) (1.583) 
ret 0.1418 0.0067 0.0285 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0009 
(3.583) (1.036) (7.272) (0.782) (-5.515) (-5.862) (2.209) 
retlag -0.2463 -0.0303 -0.0438 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0029 
(-6.399) (-4.806) (-1.483) (-8.917) (-2.918) (-2.726) (0.071) 
size 203.8779 22.2077 28.2046 0.3258 0.4830 0.4883 -1.4983 
(3.986) (2.647) (5.566) (4.477) (5.380) (5.160) (-5.720) 
volatility 380.1423 42.5298 21.2258 1.0244 1.1782 1.2112 0.8907 
(3.916) (6.311) (3.479) (5.289) (2.228) (1.184) (0.069) 
volume -8.5882 -0.9744 -1.3455 -0.0135 -0.0162 -0.0170 -0.0242 
(-5.072) (-3.508) (-8.020) (-5.587) (-5.446) (-5.416) (-7.677) 
Panel B: Pooled Regression with Industry Controls 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq c_BMA cmz cmzAlt tnov 
intercept 4.5026 0.5568 1.1987 0.0184 0.0181 0.0186 -0.0018 
(4.806) (8.650) (7.480) (1.600) (7.038) (5.644) (-5.395) 
TRA_pct -2.2505 -0.3236 -0.6742 -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0123 0.0181 
(-6.720) (-5.875) (-0.572) (-4.407) (-9.790) (-0.027) (9.442) 
QIX.Jlct -1.1520 -0.1475 -0.6850 -0.0108 -0.0065 -0.0072 0.0020 
(-3.653) (-2.845) (-2.197) (-4.126) (-1.875) (-2.467) (3.396) 
OED_pet 0.9663 0.0788 -0.0154 0.0020 0.0002 0.0001 0.0034 
(2.361) (1.171) (-0.384) (3.448) (0.301) (0.117) (4.526) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(4.367) (3.058) (5.346) (2.496) (2.705) (2.829) (3.904) 
prcln -1.2656 -0.1460 -0.2140 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0013 
(-1.911) (-5.366) (-7.862) (-8.266) (-5.719) (-4.426) (2.315) 
presq 1.7244 0.1882 0.2224 0.0030 0.0039 0.0038 0.0012 
(3.156) (2.094) (4.160) (3.861) (4.045) (3.793) (1.167) 
ret 0.1992 0.0162 0.0367 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0007 
(5.032) (2.491) (9.466) (1.283) (-4.269) (-4.512) (9.689) 
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retlag -0.2005 -0.0234 -0.0370 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0027 
(-5.235) (-3.713) (-9.862) (-8.186) (-1.819) (-1.560) (8.922) 
size 204.2416 22.6002 28.2227 0.3089 0.4714 0.4773 -1.5074 
(4.027) (2.709) (5.686) (4.309) (5.319) (5.113) (-6.156) 
volatility 417.4410 47.5414 26.5885 1.0770 1.2538 1.2933 0.7857 
(6.188) (8.132) (7.044) (7.804) (5.018) (4.079) (6.792) 
volume -8.4025 -0.9597 -1.3193 -0.0124 -0.0151 -0.0159 -0.0236 
(-4.994) (-3.468) (-8.012) (-5.215) (-5.138) (-5.127) (-7.618) 
Panel C: Fixed-Effect Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq c_BMA cmz cmzAlt tnov 
intercept 4.7302 1.0365 1.1700 0.0159 0.0157 0.016.1 -0.0018 
(7.020) (2.835) (3.111) (2.649) (2.769) (2.026) (-3.516) 
TRA_pet -2.3199 -0.0905 -0.7907 -0.0055 -0.0083 -0.0089 0.0231 
(-6.002) (-1.434) (-0.950) (-0.581) (-2.448) (-2.706) (2.827) 
QIX_pct -0.9780 -0.6116 -0.6331 -0.0079 -0.0043 -0.0049 0.0021 
(-2.575) (-9.861) (-7.072) (-5.436) (-6.608) (-7.183) (2.972) 
OED_pet 0.8035 0.2255 0.0659 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0024 0.0007 
(1.811) (3.112) (1.521) (-3.985) (-2.932) (-3.038) (0.864) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(4.098) (0.805) (5.538) (8.978) (6.387) (6.411) (5.520) 
prcln -1.2754 -0.1341 -0.2128 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0030 0.0010 
(-1.512) (-3.854) (-6.755) (-6.555) (-8.767) (-7.450) (9.094) 
presq 1.7865 0.1822 0.2152 0.0041 0.0044 0.0044 0.0018 
(3.273) (2.044) (4.038) (5.530) (4.704) (4.448) (1.760) 
ret 0.2045 0.0134 0.0412 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0006 
(5.040) (2.026) (0.408) (3.181) (-2.128) (-2.446) (8.619) 
retlag -0.1642 -0.0369 -0.0326 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0027 
(-4.153) (-5.723) (-8.440) (-0.001) (-3.276) (-2.902) (6.898) 
size 210.6084 25.9459 27.4300 0.2522 0.4260 0.4320 -1.5358 
(4.153) (3.133) (5.539) (3.704) (4.881) (4.697) (-6.612) 
volatility 425.2600 47.0616 25.7043 1.0047 1.1940 1.2316 0.7556 
(6.199) (7.753) (6.217) (6.101) (2.747) (1.837) (5.534) 
volume -8.2626 -0.5218 -1.3619 -0.0220 -0.0223 -0.0233 -0.0271 
(-4.862) (-1.880) (-8.207) (-9.622) (-7.623) (-7.548) (-8.743) 
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Table 5 - Effect of Classified Institutional Ownership on Liquidity (Quarterly) 
This table presents regression results of institution ownership on liquidity using quarterly measures. We present both 
coefficients and t-statistics. Quarterly liquidity measures are as follows: amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average 
over year of 1000000 X abs(return)/( abs(price) X volume); amh, Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over quarter of 
1000000 X abs(return)/( abs(price) X volume); amh _ ma, market adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over 
quarter of 1000000 X abs(retum)/( abs(price) X volume) over market average Amihud illiquidity measure; amh _sq, 
square root variant Amihud illiquidity measure, i.e. average over quarter of 1000 X sqrt( abs(return)/ 
abs(price) X volume); roll, Moment estimate of c, based on all reported prices, including quoted midpoints; tnov, 
turnover over the quarter, average trading volume over the quarter shares outstanding; institutional ownership measure 
include TRA "'pct, amount of shares held by transient institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported 
that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; QIX "'pct, amount of 
shares held by quasi-indexed institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long 
positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; DED "'pct, amount of shares held by 
dedicated institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long positions in the security 
of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding. Control variables are: ret, return of the quarter; retlag, return of 
last quarter;prcln, log of the price at the end of the quarter; size, the total market capitalization of the firm calculated at 
the end of the quarter (shares outstandingxprice);prcsq, square of price at the end ofthe quarter; volume, sum of the 
daily trading volume over the quarter; volatility, variance of daily return over the quarter; numtrd, sum of the daily 
trading number over the quarter. Panel A displays pooled regression results; Panel B shows 
Liqit = 0i + Ot + 81 TRA..:pctit + 82QIX..:pctit + 83DED..:pctit + Ylretit 
+ Y2retlagit + Y3prclnit + Y4sizeit + Ysprcsq + Y6volumeit 
+ Y7volatilitYit + Ysnumtrd + Eit 
Panel A: Pooled Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 7.7202 0.9844 1.3870 0.0407 -0.0008 
(3.56S) (0.691) (3.582) (0.574) (-5.807) 
TRA_pct -2.2834 -0.4280 -0.7400 -0.0365 0.0229 
(-4.766) (-6.406) (-4.213) (-4.551) (7.641) 
QIX_pet -0.8181 -0.2244 -0.6212 -0.1644 0.0003 
(-1.800) (-3.539) (-0.267) (-1.623) (0.895) 
OED_pet 1.2695 -0.0130 0.0415 -0.0183 0.0021 
(2.195) (-0.162) (1.588) (-1.893) (5.765) 
numlrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(3.684) (3.078) (7.485) (2.593) (5.891) 
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prcln -2.8021 -0.3096 -0.3187 0.0728 0.0004 
(-7.132) (-9.421) (-3.549) (7.690) (9.258) 
prcsq 23.8532 2.5094 2.0828 2.5587 0.0272 
(9.610) (7.249) (8.586) (1.633) (7.777) 
ret 0.7405 0.0661 0.0561 -0.0601 0.0026 
(4.550) (2.915) (7.642) (-2.068) (5.629) 
retlagyq -0.1413 -0.0329 -0.0493 0.0162 0.0039 
(-0.887) (-1.481) (-6.858) (6.084) (9.728) 
size 283.3582 31.8510 30.5222 -0.7556 -2.6196 
(3.408) (2.747) (8.130) (-0.543) (-1.073) 
volatility 202.3736 21.6937 6.6548 2.8124 0.2738 
(2.009) (6.917) (6.031) (8.287) (8.269) 
volume -49.2499 -5.9305 -6.2017 -1.2259 0.1575 
(-4.894) (-4.225) (-3.649) (-7.283) (5.376) 
Panel B: Pooled Regression with Industry Controls 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 8.0387 1.0245 1.4437 0.0428 -0.0017 
(9.018) (6.523) (6.950) (9.225) (-0.077) 
TRA""pct -0.3617 -0.1466 -0.5383 -0.0483 0.0185 
(-0.722) (-2.100) (-4.124) (-5.757) (1.511) 
QIX....pct -0.5684 -0.1834 -0.6149 -0.1697 -0.0005 
(-1.238) (-2.865) (-0.062) (-2.080) (-1.769) 
DED_pct 2.2549 0.1372 0.1130 -0.0309 -0.0001 
(3.825) (1.670) (4.300) (-3.130) (-0.277) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(4.591) (4.013) (9.869) (2.262) (2.466) 
prcln -3.0921 -0.3530 -0.3457 0.0752 0.0011 
(-8.552) (-1.560) (-6.732) (5.991) (2.732) 
prcsq 26.1460 2.8332 2.2925 2.5355 0.0227 
(0.519) (8.174) (0.698) (0.910) (5.167) 
ret 0.9134 0.0916 0.0747 -0.0609 0.0022 
(5.603) (4.030) (0.287) (-2.305) (2.303) 
retlagyq 0.0428 -0.0062 -0.0289 0.0154 0.0035 
(0.268) (-0.277) (-4.060) (5.754) (6.387) 
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size 285.3399 32.2485 30.5593 -0.7350 -2.6222 
(3.437) (2.786) (8.261) (-0.529) (-2.572) 
volatility 211.4110 22.9553 7.7296 2.7718 0.2550 
(2.977) (7.892) (8.852) (7.988) (6.121) 
volume -49.4627 -5.9859 -6.1630 -1.2195 0.1599 
(-4.914) (-4.264) (-3.739) (-7.234) (6.439) 
Panel C: Fixed Effeet Regression 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 7.6622 1.3814 1.3578 -0.0475 -0.0007 
(1.192) (4.494) (4.626) (-4.183) (-1.683) 
TRAJlct 0.5644 0.1767 -0.6089 -0.0598 0.0235 
(0.991) (2.228) (-4.062) (-6.327) (9.544) 
QIX_pet 0.1296 -0.5361 -0.5268 -0.1177 -0.0015 
(0.240) (-7.119) (-1.911) (-3.105) (-4.662) 
OED_pet 1.0508 0.2133 0.1240 -0.0018 -0.0014 
(1.667) (2.430) (4.426) (-0.171) (-3.704) 
numtrd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(4.994) (2.639) (1.061) (5.880) (4.161) 
prcln -3.1770 -0.3603 -0.3462 0.0709 0.0008 
(-8.244) (-1.155) (-3.783) (1.399) (5.872) 
prcsq 27.1912 2.7316 2.3166 2.4924 0.0217 
(0.911) (7.874) (0.916) (0.261) (4.684) 
ret 0.9475 0.0832 0.0824 -0.0449 0.0022 
(5.466) (3.446) (0.702) (-5.611) (1.176) 
retlagyq 0.1773 -0.0372 -0.0098 0.0195 0.0033 
(1.044) (-1.575) (-1.295) (6.901) (3.066) 
size 283.9253 36.0706 29.0132 -1.9687 -2.6215 
(3.417) (3.118) (7.857) (-1.428) (-3.160) 
volatility 214.5460 22.8025 7.6673 2.2735 0.2462 
(3.188) (7.703) (8.646) (4.806) (4.830) 
volume -51.9625 -4.7730 -6.5156 -1.6140 0.1538 
(-5.128) (-3.384) (-4.468) (-9.597) (5.577) 
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Table 6 - Study ofFD (U.S. ftrms) 
This table presents difference-in-difference results of FD study. The results are based on quarterly frequency from 1995 
to 2005. We present both coefficients and t-statistics. The sample is limited to U.S. finns (with share code other than 
30 and 31). We fixed both industry (following Kenneth French's scheme) and quarter effect. PostFD is a dummy 
variable which equals to 1 if it is after 2000. 10.23 and equals to 0 otherwise. Zit represents INS "'pct, TRA "'pct, 
QIX "'pct and DED "'pct respectively in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C. INS "'pct refers to the amount of shares held by 
institutions that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares 
outstanding. TRA "'pct refers to the amount of shares held by transient institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) 
that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; 
QIX "'pct is the amount of shares held by quasi-indexed institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported 
that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; DED "'pct is the 
amount of shares held by dedicated institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long 
positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding. 
Z,,:INS~ct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 11.7556 1.7022 1.4639 0.0972 0.0045 
(8.666) (1.655) (0.099) (2.315) (6.532) 
FD 0.2527 0.8630 -0.1597 -0.0520 -0.0004 
(0.287) (7.846) (-6.246) (-0.885) (-1.033) 
1NS-pct -15.6832 -2.1231 -1.7565 0.0660 0.0038 
(-5.753) (-8.776) (-7.981) (2.258) (0.350) 
FDxlNS_pct -0.8195 -0.7140 0.0272 -0.0335 0.0032 
(-1.300) (-9.075) (1.485) (-0.796) (1.735) 
Z,,:TRA_pct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 6.5138 0.9178 0.9682 0.1072 0.0036 
(2.176) (4.111) (8.928) (2.317) (2.508) 
FD -1.4983 -0.0447 -0.3815 -0.0430 o. 022 
(-2.030) (-0.498) (-6.828) (-0.673) (5.441) 
TRA_pct -17.5736 -2.3297 -2.3734 0.1553 0.0210 
(-7.833) (-9.445) (-8.417) (1.822) (9.278) 
FDXTRA_pct -9.7668 -0.7603 -0.5135 -0.1723 0.0035 
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(-7.522) (-4.816) (-2.877) (-1.534) (4.993) 
Zu:QIX_pct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 9.1703 1.3600 1.2803 0.1015 0.0055 
(5.745) (8.111) (2.771) (2.382) (0.308) 
FD 0.2553 1.2437 -0.1212 -0.0568 0.0001 
(0.308) (1.646) (-4.844) (-0.936) (0.294) 
Q1X-pct -20.3447 -2.8415 -2.5854 0.1035 0.0018 
(-8.003) (-0.335) (-7.805) (1.947) (5.446) 
FDxQIX_pct 4.8476 -1.0482 0.6881 -0.0598 0.0028 
(4.919) (-8.250) (3.114) (-0.829) (6.080) 
Z,,:DED-pct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 2.9134 0.4231 0.5766 0.1367 0.0066 
(7.036) (8.899) (5.418) (2.209) (2.737) 
FD -1.4037 -0.0712 -0.3021 -0.0451 0.0013 
(-2.124) (-0.939) (-1.630) (-0.457) (2.802) 
OED_pet -9.5383 -1.1505 -1.1249 0.0245 -0.0009 
(-4.135) (-4.847) (-2.400) (0.243) (-2.000) 
FDxDED_pct 6.0148 0.9026 0.7087 -0.1781 -0.0010 
(4.650) (6.077) (3.936) (-0.921) (-1.143) 
61 
Table 7 - Study ofFD (ADRs) 
This table presents difference-in-difference results of FD study. The results are based on quarterly frequency from 1995 
to 2005. We present both coefficients and t-statistics. The sample is limited to ADR finns (with share code equal tol2, 
30 or 31). We fixed both industry (following Kenneth French's scheme) and quarter effect. PostFD is a dnnnny 
variable which equals to 1 ifit is after 2000. 10.23 and equals to 0 otherwise. Zit represents TRAyet, QIXyet and 
DED yet respectively in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C. TRA yet refers to the amount of shares held by transient 
institutions (defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest 
in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; QIX yet is the amount of shares held by quasi-indexed institutions 
(defined by Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F 
filings divided by shares outstanding; DED yet is the amount of shares held by dedicated institutions (defined by 
Bushee 1998 scheme) that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings divided 
by shares outstanding. 
Z,,:TRA"pct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 17.5923 2.0815 0.9956 0.0983 0.0024 
(1.396) (1.981) (6.540) (5.473) (1.296) 
FD -5.6948 -0.8374 -0.5056 0.0154 0.0028 
(-0.313) (·0.552) (-2.300) (0.593) (1.045) 
TRA_pct -37.4958 -3.4757 -1.8148 0.0243 0.0196 
(-1.777) (-1.975) (-7.116) (0.807) (6.318) 
FDICTRA_pct 8.2679 0.4496 -0.1429 0.0518 -0.0102 
(0.287) (0.187) (-0.410) (1.261) (-2.411) 
Z,,:Q1X"pct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 32.5494 4.6214 1.1804 0.0831 0.0032 
(1.713) (1.668) (7.186) (4.828) (1.787) 
FD -11.6408 -1.1836 -0.4705 0.0019 0.0032 
(-0.408) (-0.285) (-1.910) (0.073) (1.216) 
QIX_pct -35.5522 -5.2861 -1.2055 0.0983 0.0021 
(-2.163) (-2.206) (·8.486) (6.603) (1.350) 
FDICQIX_pcl 33.2003 4.2302 0.5119 ·0.0028 -0.0032 
(1.173) (1.025) (2.093) (-0.110) (-1.191) 
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Z,,:DED_pct 
Parameter amh amh_ma amh_sq roll tnov 
intercept 1.5811 0.2809 0.4751 0.0997 0.0032 
(1.228) (1.229) (5.756) (5.078) (3.127) 
FD -0.9795 -0.1460 -0.3059 0.0110 0.0020 
(-0.471) (-0.395) (-2.294) (0.348) (1.223) 
DED_pct -6.5791 -1.2393 -1.3742 0.0083 0.0058 
(-2.940) (-3.120) (-9.581) (0.244) (3.240) 
FDxDEDJlct 7.4069 1.4633 1.3245 0.0543 -0.0033 
(2.317) (2.579) (6.465) (1.114) (-1.316) 
63 
Appendix: Gibbs Sampler 
The basic-market-adjusted model is 
IlPt: price change 
qt: transaction direction 
rm: market return 
c:trading cost 
The unknowns are parameters: c, p, (J~ and latent data: {qtl. The assumptions are: 
Gibbs Sampler estimation process is as follows: 
(1) Initialize c[Ol, p[Ol, u~[Ol, qIOl, ... , q~Ol ; 
(2) Draw e[il, p[il from f {c, p Iq~i-ll" u:[i-1l} ; 
(3) Draw qiil from f {qlle[i-1l, p[i-1l, u:[i-1l, qli-11, ... }; 
Draw qlil from f {Q2Ie[i-1l, p[i-1l, u:[i-1l, qlil , q~i-1l, ... } 
(4) Go to step (2) and repeat the process for n sweeps 
